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Chapter 1: China’s National Poor Counties (NPCs) program represents one of the largest 
anti-poverty efforts ever undertaken in a developing country. In spite of this, no causal 
analysis has been undertaken to examine whether counties which graduate from the 
program actually achieve sustainable growth after support is removed. This paper provides 
the first long-term analysis of China’s NPCs program on local development, investigating 
whether poor regions continue to develop economically after exiting the anti-poverty 
program. Focusing on the period 1986 to 2010, I construct plausible counterfactuals for 
counties that participated and graduated from the NPCs registry using the synthetic control 
method. This exercise reveals several new insights. First, on average, graduates of China’s 
anti-poverty exhibit roughly the same growth outcomes as those still receiving support 
from the program. Second, I show that focusing on the average impact masks sizeable 
heterogeneity when disaggregating to a case by case analysis of counties. Importantly, for 
the subset of counties which graduated from the first wave of the poverty reduction 
program in 1993, there is a demonstrably faster expansion post-graduation. For more 
recent county’s graduating from the program, however, I find significantly negative impacts 
of NPCs program completion in the long run. 
 
 
Chapter 2: This paper studies the impact of the 1988/1989 educational reform in Jordan 
which extended mandatory schooling from nine to ten years and restructured secondary 
schooling. Despite weakness in the Jordanian labor market, our estimates suggest that an 
additional year of required schooling in the late 1980s was sufficient to improve labor force 
participation, employment, and wages. These effects were initially largest for women, while 
males with more education were also slightly more likely to be self-employed, work longer 
hours, and earn higher wages. We show that the extensive margin labor market gains we 
observe for men strengthen with age. 
 
Chapter 3: This paper studies son preference among households in the United States. I 
present two analyses using the American Community Survey from 2012 to 2016. First, I 
estimate son preference in aggregate among parents in the U.S., contrasting immigrant 
populations to that of native born individuals. I consider evidence of two direct 
mechanisms – fertility stopping decisions and gender selection behavior. I show that there 
is no evidence of son preference among families in the U.S in aggregate through either 
mechanism, but there is indirect evidence of son preference -- mothers of daughters are 
less likely to be married than mothers of sons. Next, I analyze assimilation of immigrant 
gender preferences to U.S. norms relying on variation in duration of residence in the U.S., 
age of migration, and generation of migration. I find significant evidence to support the 
claim of son preference among first-generation immigrant populations originating from 
Asia and find that those son preferences were formed early in life, and once established, 
persist among first-generation immigrants. Higher order generations exhibit weaker gender 
x 
 
selection, consistent with assimilation to U.S. norms. Assimilation exhibits a high degree of 
heterogeneity across populations. Second and higher order generation Chinese immigrants 
conform to U.S. norms, while surprisingly, Indian immigrants exhibit even stronger son 
preference among higher-order generations.
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Chapter 1. The Long Run Impact of China's Anti-Poverty Program: A 
Synthetic Control Analysis 
1.1 Introduction 
China has demonstrated remarkable success in poverty alleviation over the past three 
decades. The number of individuals living on less than $1 per day decreased by a staggering 
442 million from 1984 to 2005. This reduction alone accounts for 96% of the decrease in 
poverty headcounts across the developing world over this period (Chen and Ravallion, 2010). 
Despite this progress, little is reliably known regarding the efficacy of government policies 
aimed at poverty reduction.1 A clearer understanding of the mechanisms through which this 
progress has been made, is therefore relevant for continued development, for informing 
government resource allocation decisions, as well as for drawing generalizable lessons which 
may be useful for other developing counties (Ravallion, 2009).2 
This paper seeks to address this gap by providing evidence regarding the long-term 
impacts of graduating from China’s most ambitious anti-poverty campaign to date, the 
National Poor Counties (NPCs) program. Targeted at the county level and initiated by the 
Chinese central government in 1986, the NPCs program continues to provide substantial 
support to regions of the country today. Through the program, a subset of poor counties is 
targeted with government support for the purposes of reducing poverty. When a region is 
                                                 
1 Loayza and Raddatz (2010) find that not only the rate of economic growth but also the growth structure 
matters for poverty reduction. Unskilled labor-intensive sectors like agriculture, construction, and 
manufacturing contribute the most to poverty alleviation. Rapid growth in agriculture significantly reduces 
poverty in Vietnam and rural areas of Indonesia (Janvry and Sadoulet, 2010; Suryahadi et al., 2009), however, 
the expansion in social security and social assistance transfers in Brazil are the largest contributors of the 
poverty reduction during 1984 to 2004 (Ferreira et al., 2010). 
2 There were 15% and 41% of people in South Asia and Sub-Saharan African living on less than $1.9 per day 
in 2013. Given the sheer scale of poverty reduction in the country, China’s growth of income per capita is thus 
the primary determinant of global poverty reduction along this threshold. (Xavier, 2006). 
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considered developed, this support is withdrawn, and the county graduates from the 
program. Theoretically, over the long-term, a graduating county could demonstrate 
improved performance after graduation because it has been nudged into a stronger growth 
position, for example as individuals escape a subsistence poverty trap. Or a county could 
experience worse economic performance because regular governmental support has now 
been withdrawn.  
Using the synthetic control approach of Abadie et al. (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010), 
I first demonstrate that on average counties which graduate from this program demonstrate 
long-term economic performance similar to non-graduates. Second, leveraging the synthetic 
control method to examine the impact on a period-by-period and county-by-county basis, I 
demonstrate that there is sizeable heterogeneity in the estimated impacts of graduating from 
NPCs designation across participants and over time. Specifically, the only robust evidence 
for long-term growth gains of the program appears to be concentrated among counties 
which graduated during the first wave of the poverty reduction program in 1993. For 
counties which graduate at later dates, I find that graduating from the program does appear 
to significantly hinder growth in these regions relative to their synthetic counterparts in the 
long run. 
Several aspects of this analysis are novel. First, despite the massive scale of the NPCs 
designation program, few papers have studied China’s poverty alleviation program, and those 
that do so have produced somewhat mixed results regarding its efficacy (Jalan and Ravallion, 
1998; Park et al., 2002; Meng 2013; Park and Wang, 2010, Qin and Chong 2016).3 This 
research reaffirms several findings in this nascent literature and builds on our understanding 
                                                 
3 Park et al. (2002) and Meng (2013) find annual increase on income of 0.91% to 6.4% of the program within 
the disbursement period. 
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of the program’s benefits and shortcomings. These results also add to analysis of other anti-
poverty programs in china. For example, Ravallion and Chen (2005) find a sizable and 
statistically significant impact of World Bank’s Southwest Program (SWP), a poverty 
alleviation program in China from 1995 to 2000, on mean income within the disbursement 
period (annually 9% increase on average).  
Second, pre-existing research has focused on contemporaneous impacts of the 
program. This means that perhaps the most important question for assessing the success of 
a poverty reduction program – whether there are long-term impacts years after government 
support has been withdrawn, remains unanswered.4 Indeed, the poverty reduction program 
aims to, not merely reduce the number of individuals living in poverty, but also to establish 
the sustainable development of NPCs through enhancing the local economy and improving 
infrastructure.5 However, sustainable development implies that graduates of national poor 
counties registry continue growth after the external aid disbursement ends. 
This paper fills this gap. Long-term impacts are critically important for understanding 
whether NPCs designation and participation in an anti-poverty program in general, can 
generate sustained economic growth after the program ends – i.e. in the absence of continued 
government support. To the extent that poor counties were stagnant prior to NPCs 
designation, these results are important for understanding whether the NPCs program can 
help counties escape subsistence poverty traps and transition toward sustained growth.  
Perhaps the closest analysis in this regard is Chen et al. (2009), which examines the medium-
                                                 
4 In many ways, this is conceptually the aim of anti-poverty programs in comparison to transfer schemes. 
Evidence of long-term impacts presented here thus helps answer this important policy question. 
5 It is emphasized by the central government in “Outline of China's Rural Poverty Alleviation and Development 
(2001-2010)” and “The National Poverty Alleviation Program (1994-2000)”. 
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run impacts of the World Bank SWP anti-poverty program, finding sizable impacts which 
persist for four years after the external aid ended. 
China has undertaken three waves of the NPCs designation poverty reduction 
program, wherein the government designated certain, qualifying counties as national poor 
counties. Once classified as such, the counties received generous financial support and 
benefits. For example, the central government provided a total of $14.9 billion (124 billion 
RMB) in the second wave of poverty alleviation program, annually accounting for 
approximately 5%-7% of total central government expenditures, and the total poverty funds, 
which mainly include subsidized loans, Food-for-Work, and budgetary grants, reached 232.7 
billion RMB during 1986-2002 (Wang et al., 2004). The benefits of the program included 
subsidized loans, grants, tax reliefs, infrastructure construction and other investment 
privileges from central and local governments (Park et al., 2002). Those short-run programs 
may have long-term effects through the potential mechanisms, for example, improved 
infrastructure can support higher income growth in the future, the existence of health care 
system support healthier and more efficient labor, and lower tax burden provide higher 
disposable income for families to invest in small business. There were 258 national poor 
counties in 1986, while this number increased to 592 in 1994 and stayed constant thereafter.6 
Counties graduate from the program once they successfully pass one or more predetermined 
thresholds of poverty and new counties take their place immediately.7  
Methodologically, this paper contributes more broadly to the literature evaluating 
regional anti-poverty campaigns, of which the NPCs program is an important example. 
                                                 
6 The number of counties in China changed slightly from year to year. In 1994, there were 1735 counties; and 
in 2010, there were 1636 counties, as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
7 “Graduate” means that national poor counties left the anti-poverty program according to the fact that they 
passed the predetermined thresholds of poverty in 1993, 2000, or 2010. The decision of graduation is made by 
the central and provincial governments.  
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Specifically, I use the synthetic control approach to uncover the dimensions through which 
poverty reduction has occurred across space and time in China, leveraging this approach to 
answer multiple policy relevant questions.  
First, through an aggregated synthetic counterfactual (Cavallo et al. 2013), I estimate 
the overall average treatment effect of NPCs graduating from the program. In comparison 
to counties designated as NPCs but which have not yet graduated, I find no robust difference 
in economic status 7 to 10 years later. On average, the treated group has only a 2.78% (2 to 
85 yuan (RMB) based on 1500 to 3500 yuan (RMB)) annually higher net income per capita 
in graduated NPCs relative to the synthetic controls. Second, disaggregating by wave of the 
NPCs program, I present evidence of robust growth effects for the 1993 cohort of graduates, 
not evident for later cohorts. For example, seven years after graduation, the net income per 
capita of the treated counties in group 1, 2, and 3 increase by 91%, 42%, and 44% respectively 
since graduation, while the synthetic counterfactual sees a 44%, 53%, and 65% increase. 
These estimates contrast the impact of graduation for counties which participated in the 
NPCs with one another, alleviating concerns over selection into the program and the 
evolution of political favoritism on potential growth outcomes. If anything, political 
favoritism should bias towards findings negative impacts of the program, since graduating 
counties receive less support, and may thus be less of a focal point for the government. 
Finally, using the synthetic control approach, I also rerun the analysis contrasting the 
post-graduation growth experience of NPCs against a second counterfactual built entirely 
from the subset of counties which never participated in the program. This counterfactual 
pool suffers less from issues of selection out of treatment and represents a desirable 
benchmark of economic activity in the economy, with the tradeoff of not being able to 
compare the impact of no-longer receiving aid to counties which do receive aid.  
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Relative to a synthetic of counties which never participated, the set of counties 
graduating in 1993 appears to demonstrate stronger economic performance 7 years out. 
Counties graduating at a later date exhibit slightly slower growth on average. As the results 
are similar when counterfactuals are constructed from the pool of non-participant counties, 
this provides additional confidence suggesting that the findings obtained when comparing 
NPCs which have graduated to those which have not yet graduated are not merely an artifact 
of unobserved factors which may drive selection into and out of the program such as 
government favoritism. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the three 
waves of poverty reduction program in China and describes research examining the 
contemporaneous effects of this program. Section 3 discusses the sample and data summary. 
Section 4 explains how the synthetic control method works. Section 5.1 presents estimates 
of the overall average impact of graduating from the NPCs program. Section 5.2 
disaggregates these results by program wave, while Section 5.3 examines the results for 
individual counties. Section 5.4 explores the robustness of the results to the use of an 
alternative counterfactual pool. Section 6 concludes and discusses avenues for future 
investigation. 
1.2 Anti-Poverty Policy in China: National Poor Counties 
In the 1980s, China’s economy was predominantly agrarian and suffered from high 
rates of rural poverty. In 1986, the central government formed the State Council Leading 
Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development (hereafter The Leading Group), an 
agency of the State Council and a specialized institution to direct and lead the anti-poverty 
policies nationwide. Through the Leading Group, the Chinese government initiated the first 
wave of poverty reduction program over the period from 1986 to 1993.  
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Initially, in 1986, the Leading Group designated 258 poor counties as national poor 
counties based on whether counties’ rural net income per capita was less than 150 RMB in 
1985.8 These counties were targeted to receive support and transfers. By 1989, there were a 
total of 331 counties on the list of NPCs, and that list did not change until 1993.9 From the 
maps of NPCs in figure 2, it is clear that there is a geographic pattern. NPCs in the first wave 
of poverty reduction program are more likely to be located in the middle part of China, while 
those that graduated (exited from the NPCs program) were more likely to be counties in the 
eastern region. 
In 1994, the Leading Group adjusted the member of NPCs based on counties’ rural 
net income per capita as of 1992.10 As shown in figure 1, the total number of NPCs reached 
592 and did not change during the entire period of the second wave of anti-poverty program 
from 1994 to 2000. As shown in figure 2, NPCs in the second wave of the program were 
concentrated in the middle and western regions, while counties which graduated from the 
program were predominantly located in the middle and eastern parts of the country. 
Graduation only occurred in the final year of each wave (1993, 2000 and 2010). There is no 
county’s leaving that happens during each wave of poverty reduction program.   
During the first two waves of alleviation poverty program, the central government 
provided substantial funds on an annual basis through three main channels: subsidized loans, 
Food-For-Work, and government budgetary grants.11 Projects were expected to improve the 
                                                 
8 The threshold for minority counties was 200 RMB in 1985 and 300 RMB for the revolutionary base counties. 
9 For political considerations, other 73 counties, mainly are revolutionary base areas and pastoral counties, were 
successively added onto the list of NPCs from 1986 to 1989.  
10 Counties with net income per capita below 400 RMB were designated as national poor counties, while 
existing national poor counties whose net income per capita exceeded 700 RMB (the threshold of subsistence) 
graduated from the program. 
11 Subsidized loans supported the poor households and enterprises of poor areas in industry and agriculture; 
Food-For-Work sought to develop infrastructure, such as constructing roads, building water storage facilities 
and afforestation to provide job opportunities to surplus farm labors; Government budgetary grants were 
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economy in NPCs and to directly assist poor residents. Nevertheless, these figures do not 
capture the full extent of the NPCs program as some less well documented funding also 
occurred outside these three main channels.12  
The third wave started in 2001. During this wave, the Leading Group not only altered 
the set of counties designated as NPCs but also modified the criteria for selection. They 
abandoned the single poverty line criterion and used a new composite index to select NPCs, 
which consists of poverty headcount, rural net income per capita, local GDP per capita, and 
local fiscal revenue per capita.13 
The contemporaneous impact of NPCs designation has been studied by a few 
researchers, each examining slightly different samples or time frames. Jalan and Ravallion 
(1998) find that in the first wave of the program, consumption growth is higher in areas 
covered by the program relative to uncovered areas. Park et al. (2002) show that the 
alleviation program had a significant, positive impact on rural income growth, with a 2.25% 
annual increase in growth rates from 1985 to 1992 and 0.91% from 1992 to 1995.  
Meng (2013) applies a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design method to 
evaluate the overall effectiveness of the second wave of poverty alleviation program during 
the period of 1994-2000. He finds that the overall effect of the program was to promote 
rural net income per capita by roughly 38% or 6.4% per year.  Park and Wang (2010) estimate 
the impact of poverty alleviation program using matching methods on panel data from 2001 
to 2004, studying household and village level income and consumption. They find that the 
                                                 
mainly used to improve primary education and basic health care, knowledge and technology diffusive, 
promotion of culture and training in poor areas. 
12 Total poverty funds include all sources of anti-poverty funds like funds from provincial governments and 
international poverty funds, but not just the three main channels. The percentage of poverty funds through the 
three main types of anti-poverty projects was about 96% of the total poverty funds for the first wave of the 
program. 
13 More details regarding China’s anti-poverty program are available upon request. 
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program did not affect household income and consumption for the poorest but increased 
richer households’ income and consumption by 6.1% to 9.2%. However, Qin and Chong 
(2016) find the ineffectiveness of the third wave of national poor counties program. The 
relative growth rate of GDP, local government revenue and income of participant counties 
were found to be negative in comparison to non-participant counties.  Seems like, previous 
literature find positive effect for the first two waves of the program, while negative effect for 
the third wave of the program. 
Since this article estimates the long-term impacts of China’s poverty reduction 
program, it serves to complete Park et al. (2002) and Meng (2013) but also to generate 
estimates of unique policy relevance and importance. Observing some contemporaneous 
impacts is unsurprising given that the poor counties receive generous financial aid packages, 
as we should mechanically expect to witness increases in short-term consumption and 
income from the transfers.  
As such, it seems inadequate to judge the merit of China’s poverty alleviation 
program based solely on the short-run effects; because if the graduating counties stagnate or 
regress in terms of growth and poverty reduction, then it suggests the NPCs program is 
nothing more than a transfer or subsidy. If instead, they realize sustain growth, then it implies 
that the program may have fundamentally altered the counties, achieving lasting poverty 
reduction. In this subsequent section, I emphasize sustainable growth after graduation, a 
fundamental goal of any poverty reduction program.  
1.3 Sample and Data Summary 
In this paper, I consider the effects of poverty reduction policies undertaken at the 
county level for consistency, even though a few administrative county-level cities and 
10 
 
suburban districts of the major cities were designated as NPCs.14 Among NPCs, three joined 
the program twice. They were designated as NPCs during the first wave of the program, then 
graduated from the program as non-poverty counties in 1993, and were re-assigned to the 
program in 2001.15 Anecdotally, the existence of these counties serves to demonstrate the 
motivation for this article’s analysis: namely the question of whether China’s poverty 
alleviation program establishes sustainable growth is an important one as graduating counties 
may regain high levels of poverty in the long-term. 
Moreover, the synthetic control method provides the specific effect for each treated 
unit instead of only the average effect for the treated group, which provides the access to 
identification of heterogeneous effects. This particular strategy is thus well suited to measure 
the long-term effect of a treatment, which requires that I track the evolution of the outcome 
variable for many years post-treatment. Therefore, the feasible sample is limited to poor 
counties that graduated from the first two waves.16 
There are several technical nuances worth noting when studying poverty alleviation. 
Duclos et al. (2010) argue that any analysis of poverty would be biased if the estimators of 
interest are non-linear across time periods. Therefore, in addition to looking at any aggregate 
impacts, I also divide the sample into three sub-groups, according to the different entry time 
and durations of poor counties in the program, to estimate the overall average effects for 
                                                 
14 Counties whose designation changed to be county level cities or suburban districts of big cities in the duration 
of aiding poor policies are not included in my sample, because the change suggests those regions are different 
from other NPCs at the administrative level. These changes were not uncommon with 21 cases in the first 
wave of poverty reduction program; 32 cases in the second wave, and 24 cases in the third wave. In China, 
cities are usually treated as the upper administrative division of counties, but a few regions are designated as 
county-level cities. To the extent that prosperous regions become upgraded to city level regions, the results I 
observe may understate the true impact of the NPCs program. 
15 They are Guidongxian, Ruchengxian, and Chengbumiaozuzizhixian. Based on the available data, from 1994 
to 1998, the average growth rate of net income per capita for Guidongxian and Ruchengxian is 22.5%, while 
the average growth rate for non-participant counties and NPCs are 63% and 45%.   
16 The third wave of poverty reduction program was ended in 2010. 
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each group and also each wave. As shown in Table 1, they are here define as group 1, counties 
that entered the program in 1986 and graduated in 1993 with 8 years’ benefits from the 
program, which means they participated in and then graduated from the first wave of the 
program; group 2, counties that were designated as NPCs in 1994 and graduated from the 
program in 2000, or they participated in and graduated from the second wave of the program; 
and, group 3, counties that stayed in the program from 1986 through 2000, benefiting for 15 
years, or it represents counties that participated in the first wave of the program and 
graduated from the second wave.17 
Since I want to test whether the growth trend of NPCs changes with the end of 
external aid disbursement, I have two potential control groups for the choice of 
counterfactuals. One is the NPCs that participated in the program at the same time of the 
treated counties entry but remained in the program as the treated counties graduated. 
Another one is the non-participant counties that never have been designated as NPCs in 
China. Even though the synthetic control results are similar for the two potential control 
groups, the former one is more appropriate according to the criterion of donor pool of 
synthetic control, which restricts the control group to counties that have similar 
characteristics as the treated counties in pre-treatment period.18    
I obtain county level data from China Statistical Yearbooks Database of CNKI 
(China National Knowledge Infrastructure). The database was generated by Tsinghua 
University and Tsinghua Tongfang Company in June 1999 and covers almost all published 
                                                 
17 Previous literature on the effects of the second and third wave of poverty reduction program does not 
distinguish the effects of the previous waves of poverty reduction program from the estimated effects of the 
latter two waves, given that NPCs in the second and third wave may also have taken part in the previous waves 
of the program. 




Yearbooks in China at the national, provincial, city, county, and industry levels. Further 
statistics are derived from official Yearbooks like China County (City) Social and Economic 
Statistical Yearbook (1996, 2000-2011), China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy 
(2000-2011), China County Statistical Yearbook (1980-1991), China rural statistical yearbook 
(1987-2011), China’s Ethnic Statistical Yearbook (1987-2011) as well as provincial 
yearbooks, cities’ yearbooks, and counties’ yearbooks.  
The main criterion for designating as a national poor county is rural net income per 
capita, which measures the average net income level of permanent residents within a given 
rural area. Net income is defined as gross income (including cash and income in kind) less 
taxes, fees, operating expenses of family businesses and depreciation of fixed assets. Data on 
rural residents’ income is derived from national surveys conducted by the National Bureau 
of Statistics.    
Table 2 presents summary statistics for non-participant counties, comparing NPCs 
to all others from 1986 to 2010. As expected, the results in Table 2 suggest that NPCs’ 
average GDP per capita, population, area per capita, fiscal revenue per capita, residents’ 
savings balance per capita, and rural net income per capita are significantly lower than the 
non-participant counties’ averages. NPCs are more likely to be bordered, pastoral, minority, 
and mountainous counties. On comparing the final year within disbursement period with the 
first year, the growth in savings rate is much higher for NPCs relative to the national average. 
The high savings rate finding is consistent with Chen et al. (2009), which implies that the 
sizable increase in income during the disbursement period is transient (it was saved) when 
we interpret it in Permanent-Income Hypothesis.19 Table 2 also provides similar summary 
                                                 




statistics for graduated NPCs and ungraduated NPCs from 1986 to 2010. Table 2 shows that 
graduated NPCs have higher GDP per capita, population, fiscal revenue per capita, residents’ 
savings balance per capita and net income per capita than ungraduated NPCs on average. 
This table also shows that graduated NPCs have relatively lower average area per capita, the 
ratio of primary industry added value/GDP, and less likely to be a border, mountainous and 
minority counties.  
The average rural net income per capita for NPCs in 1986 was 786.41 RMB, about 
68% of the national average. In 2010, the average net income for NPCs was 2,710, more 
than tripling the value in 1986, a statistic, which, when viewed in isolation, gives the 
impression that the poverty reduction program must be a success. However, a closer look 
reveals that the country average grew at a comparable or, in some cases, faster rate. Figure 3 
depicts the trends of rural net income per capita for both the NPCs and non-participant 
counties. It shows similar trends, yet the line of NPCs always lies below the non-participant 
counties line, which implies that the perceived success of the poverty relief may merely be a 
byproduct of China’s fast nationwide growth (Montalvo and Ravallion, 2010).20 The NPCs 
line converges to the non-participant line before 1994 but diverges after 1994, which 
supports the argument that the impacts of poverty reduction program on income growth 
may have declined in the 1990s in Park et al. (2002).     
Figure 4 plots the gap of average net income per capita between graduated NPCs 
and non-participant counties for each group. Figure 4.A depicts that the gap between 
graduated NPCs in group 1 and non-participant counties is narrower over time, or that the 
trend of average net income per capita for graduated NPCs converges to the trend of non-
                                                 
20 Higher economic growth periods were associated with higher rates of poverty reduction periods during 1981 
to 2001 in China (Ravallion and Chen, 2007).  
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participant counties. In 1999, the graduated NPCs had a higher average income level than 
non-participant counties. It means that the poor counties that graduated in group 1 
performed as well as or even better than other non-participant counties on average after they 
graduated from the first wave of poverty reduction program in 6 years. Figure 4.B shows the 
common trend of average net income per capita between graduated NPCs in group 2 and 
non-participant counties from 1994 to 2000, but the gap between them enlarges from 2001 
to 2010. It means that, on average, the graduated NPCs in group 2 had similar income growth 
as non-participant counties when they were receiving the aid disbursement, but were not as 
good as non-participant counties when the external aid disbursement ended. From Figure 
4.C, I find the same results as in Figure 4.B for graduated NPCs in group 3. The two trends 
parallel with each other from 1986 to 2000 but diverge from 2000 to 2010. Prima facie, 
graduating counties appear to have performed worse relative to non-participant counties 
after aid flows are suspended.  Section 4 explores this relationship causally.  
1.4 Empirical Strategy 
1.4.1 Treatment  
      I study the long-term impact of the NPCs program on income. In particular, I 
am interested in whether poor counties sustain growth, after graduation, at a pace 
comparable to that achieved during the disbursement period. If the impacts of anti-poverty 
program die out just after the poor counties’ graduation, one can regard the NPCs program 
as just providing immediate extra funds for those poor counties within the disbursement 
period, but may have little impact on poor counties’ economic structure, labor structure, and 
local infrastructure, having little impact on poor counties’ growth capacity. One can 
conceptualize this possibility as the poverty alleviation program merely giving a man a fish, 
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rather than teaching a man to fish. If instead the counties grow sustainably in comparison to 
those still receiving aid, such evidence suggests that the program may have helped the region 
change structurally, for example to escape poverty traps.  
The treatment effect in this article is the long-term impact of participating in the anti-
poverty program after having received external governmental aid for seven to fifteen years. 
Therefore, the key event or intervention in interest is the graduation of poor counties from 
the NPCs program. That is to say, the primary focus of the analysis is NPCs regions that 
participated in and then graduated from the poverty reduction program (for simplicity, these 
can be thought of as treated counties).21 Establishing the treatment effect in such a manner 
facilitates an analysis of the program’s effect on sustained, long-term growth. The 
relationship among counties, NPCs, graduated and ungraduated NPCs, and non-participant 
counties are reported in Table 3. Table 3 also illustrates the particular treatment group and 
control group for the short-run and long-run impacts estimation. 
In 1993, 20 of the counties which had entered the NPCs registry in 1986 graduated 
from the program (group 1). In 2000, 74 poor counties exited the program, but not all 
“graduated.”22 A compulsory policy forced out 33 poor counties from five wealthy, eastern 
provinces (Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong).23 Due to the inherent 
uncertainty regarding valid graduation, I omit the aforementioned counties from the analysis. 
This leaves as the treated sample, 41 graduating counties in 2000, of which 27 originally 
started in 1993 (group 2) and 14 had participated in the program for its full existence – the 
                                                 
21 Unlike the existing literature, which views entry into the national poor counties registry as treatment, in this 
article, counties that participate in and then graduate from the registry compose the treatment group. 
22 The graduation rate, 20 out of 331 and 41 out of 592, were low for both waves of poverty reduction program.  
23 These particular counties exited based solely on the compulsory political policy and the fact that they are in 
those five wealthy provinces, but not according to the graduation criteria. 
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15 years from 1986 to 2000 (group 3). To summarize, these three sets of treated counties 
include 20 poor counties in group 1, 27 in group 2, and 14 in group 3. 
1.4.2 Empirical Strategy  
In this article, I use the synthetic control approach developed in Abadie et al. (2003) 
and formalized in Abadie et al. (2010) to evaluate the long-term causal effect of poverty 
reduction program. The synthetic control method has been applied to many different topics, 
such as development, politics, and labor (Cavallo et al., 2013; Abadie et al., 2014; Dube and 
Zipperer, 2015; Grier and Maynard, 2016). Below I sketch an outline of the synthetic control 
method (SCM) in this context. A more technical description of the methodology can be 
found in Abadie et al. (2010). 
Identification of the causal effect of a policy is often difficult to ascertain because of 
selection effects- for example because central planners do not assign policy randomly. In this 
analysis, counties that graduated from poverty reduction program likely differ fundamentally 
from those that remain (or from those that never participated). A simple direct comparison 
between treated and untreated counties will generate biased estimates.  
 Ideally, the problem could be overcome if I could simultaneously observe the 
graduate counties both with and without the treatment of intervention. 24  Since this is 
impossible, one alternative is to construct a counterfactual for the treated counties to answer 
the following question: how would we expect the treated counties to fare, had they not left 
the poverty alleviation program? One way to create a counterfactual is through the SCM, 
which is based on the notion that a combination of comparative counties generally resembles 
                                                 
24 Suppose we have a population of i=1, 2,…, N and Di=1 (Treatment) or Di=0 (Control). Then, the treatment 
effect relative to control for county i is, 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑌1𝑖 −  𝑌0𝑖 , where 𝑌1𝑖 is 𝑌𝑖 if Di=1 and 𝑌0𝑖 is 𝑌𝑖 if Di=0; 𝑇𝑖  is the 
causal effect.  
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the characteristics of a treated county better than any single comparison county alone. This 
methodology is particularly suited for comparative case studies given that it analyzes only 
one treated county at a time. 
If the constructed counterfactual closely matches the unit of interest prior to the 
treatment event, in theory, a synthetic county would be expected to have the same behavior 
as the treated county would have had in the post-treatment period if it were to keep receiving 
external aid. Thus, I can estimate the causal impact by contrasting the post-treatment 
difference between the treated (graduating counties) and their synthetic controls.25 
This method in many ways resembles the difference-in-differences approach with 
the assumption of common trend being essential for plausible inference. Their major 
differences are that, first, difference-in-differences only requires the treated and the control 
groups to have parallel pre-treatment paths of the outcome variable (i.e. common trend) 
while synthetic control attempts to make their paths overlap with each other. Second, 
difference-in-differences analysis typically produces an aggregated average of every unit in 
the control pool while the synthetic control method utilizes a weighted average of the most 
relevant matches and as such only a few units are typically assigned positive weights. Finally, 
unlike difference-in-differences, accounting for only the time-invariant unobservable missing 
variable bias, synthetic control can account for the time-variant unobservable omitted 
variable bias, which is important to the identification of causal effects of China’s anti-poverty 
program given that the anti-poverty program occurred in three waves and the treated 
counties receive treatment at different periods.  
A key criterion of the selection of comparative counties for the donor pool is that 
the control counties should have similar characteristics as the treated counties in pre-
                                                 
25 Technical proof and details can be found in Abadie et al. (2010).   
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treatment period and those control counties should not be affected by the treatment in post-
treatment period.26 Thus, I first select a donor pool of NPCs that entered the program at the 
same time as graduated NPCs, but did not leave the program when the treated counties 
graduated. Moreover, each national poor county received similar amount of anti-poverty 
funds per year on average, which supports that the remaining NPCs are good comparative 
units for the treated counties. As an additional exercise, I consider an alternative pool of 
donor counties comprised of “non-participant counties” – non-participant in the sense that 
they never participated in the NPCs program.27 This provides a counterfactual of economic 
growth in China among similar regions in the post-treatment period, and can thus also 
provide useful inferences about the post-graduation path of participants. These results can 
be found in Section 5.4.  
The SCM constructs a synthetic counterfactual by creating a weighted average of all 
potential comparison counties, which reproduces the pre-treatment characteristics of the 
treated unit, including the trajectory of the outcome variable (rural net income per capita in 
this article) and the average values of the variables that have predictive power for the 
outcome variable.  To optimize the weights such that the synthetic control most closely 
approximates the treated county, Abadie et al. (2010) recommend an algorithm to minimize 
the mean squared prediction error between the treated unit’s outcome variable as well as 
predictors and the synthetic’s in pre-treatment period. Furthermore, in computing weights 
for the untreated units, one should ensure that the treated unit’s data falls within the convex 
                                                 
26 To avoid interpolation biases, Abadie et al. (2015) require the care restricting the units of donor pool with 
characteristics similar to the treated units. 
27 I am grateful to two anonymous referees for the suggestion of this potential donor pool as an additional way 
of conceptualizing the long-term impacts of graduation from the NPCs program. 
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hull of the control units’ data. That is, all weights are non-negative and sum to one.28 This 
exercise guards against extrapolation bias. 
Recall that in this setting, treated counties graduate from the program, while control 
counties remain NPCs designated and continue to receive support. Since categorization is 
based on the economic performance of the county, treated counties, by definition, 
outperform all others and thus may not fall within the convex hull of the data. This could 
jeopardize the validity of the exercise empirically; however, several factors suggest that the 
SCM is likely still appropriate in this context.  
First, the criterion of graduation from the poor reduction program in 1993 depended 
only on the level of net income per capita in 1992, not on the growth trajectory of income 
from 1986 to 1993.29 Second, the central government did not strictly follow the criterion of 
graduation in 1993 to decide which counties should leave and which counties should stay in 
the second wave of the program.30 Park et al. (2002) find that political factors like lobbying 
efforts influenced the designation of NPCs. Moreover, Meng (2013) states that 
administrators may rely on other unobservable variables to designate the second wave of 
NPCs. Third, the central government provides different criterion for designating as NPCs 
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∗ is an element of the vector of weights 𝑊 =
(𝑤1 , … , 𝑤𝐽)
′
such that 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 and 𝑤1 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝐽 = 1; j=1, …, J represent the units in donor pool;  𝑌0𝑗𝑡0 is the 
outcome of control unit j in pretreatment period and 𝑌1𝑖𝑡0 is the outcome of treated unit i in pretreatment 
period;  𝑡0 represents the pretreatment period; Z is a vector of observed covariates. 
29 The criterion for graduation from poverty reduction program in 1993 is that the net income per capita of 
poor county in 1992 was larger than 700 yuan (current price).  
30 The net income per capita of graduated counties like Gaolanxian and Zhengningxian in Gansu province, 
Linquxian and Yiyuanxian in Shandong province were less than 700 yuan in 1992. However, the net income 
per capita of staying counties like Lianchengxian, Shanghangxian, Wupingxian, and Changtingxian in Fujian 
province, Guangchangxian in Jiangxi province, Balinzuoqi, Wushenqi, Balinyouqi, and Keshiketengqi in 
Neimenggu province, Yanchixian in Ningxia province, and Yinanxian in Shandong province were larger than 
700 yuan in 1992. 
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for minority counties, “revolutionary base” counties, and other normal counties.31  The 
arbitrary nature of these assignments suggests that economic considerations are not the sole 
determinants. Fourth, the relative income level ranks of NPCs change significantly over time. 
I use a transition matrix to estimate the frequency of the transition. Table 4 reports the 
mobility of relative income ranks of poor counties from 1986 to 1992. I find that high income 
per capita counties in 1986 do not necessarily remain in the highest net income per capita 
group in 1992. Furthermore, low income per capita counties in 1986 could become a part of 
the highest income level group in 1992. This jostling in positions suggests that creating a 
synthetic control for the counties that graduated by using the counties that did not graduate 
as donors should be a viable exercise. Finally, in practice, I empirically find a set of control 
counties for each treated county which produce a close match of pre-treatment observables. 
For the second wave of poverty reduction program, each province government 
determines the graduation criterion, and the central government only limits the number of 
NPCs that each province has. Although this means that finding valid donors within a 
province is less likely, there still exists a sufficient across-province variation to obtain suitable 
donors to legitimately employ synthetic control.  
There is no conventional method for inference (e.g., z-tests or t-tests) in the SCM. 
Instead, I carry out a placebo test proposed in Abadie et al. (2010) to compute the 
significance level and to enhance the credibility of the findings. This test, in essence, is a type 
of permutation test, which is nonparametric and does not entail distributional assumptions 
about the data. Functionally, I test whether or not the growth effect observed could also be 
purely due to randomness. That is, there could be some random variation in the growth of 
                                                 
31 The poverty line for non-participant counties in 1985 was 150 yuan, which was the criterion of designation 
in 1986. However, for political consideration, the cutoff for minority countries was 200 yuan and for 
“revolutionary base” counties were 300 yuan.  
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rural net income per capita not associated with the impact of poverty reduction program 
across counties. Perhaps the observed post-treatment gap between the treated and the 
synthetic county exists simply because the graduate county happens to be the one that grows 
faster in post-treatment, a phenomenon which might occur absent treatment. Thus, I 
estimate the probability of witnessing such a gap when the treatment does not occur simply 
by shuffling the labels of treatment and controls, and recalculating the gap on each 
permutation.  
More specifically, I use the same synthetic control procedure (the same pre-treatment 
period and the same list of indicator variables) to form a synthetic counterpart for every 
county in the donor pool and record their gaps. I then put all gaps together in a graph and 
rank them. For example, assume there are 49 units in the donor pool, and if the estimated 
synthetic effect is larger than any of the 49 placebo effects, this is a strong indicator that 
treatment results in an outsized impact in the post treatment period, and one could nominally 
assign a pseudo significance level based on the rank of 1/50=2%.   
To estimate the average long-term impacts of poverty reduction program for each 
group, I compute the post-treatment average effect and the statistical significance of 
estimated effects for each group by following the method of Cavallo et al. (2013). This new 
technique allows my analysis to contrast the average impact with that for individual groups 
and counties. For each group, I calculate the estimated average effect for each post-treatment 
year and follow the four steps which are introduced in Cavallo et al. (2013) to construct a 
distribution of average placebo effects; and then I can find the significance level for the 
estimated average effects. To increase the comparability of the placebo counties, I restrict 
the donor pool, which is used to compute the significance level of the estimated average 
effects, by match quality. Only controls that match as well as treated counties in pre-
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treatment are included in the placebo pool to estimate the distribution of average effect. 
(Cavallo et al., 2013 and Galiani and Quistorff, 2016)32 
1.5 Results 
For counties leaving the program in 1993 and 2000, I examine the growth of net 
income per capita one to seven and ten years after their graduation. These time windows are 
potentially wide enough for the program to take effect and long enough to capture the long-
term effects after graduation. The number of pre-treatment years considered depends on the 
duration of poverty reduction program and data availability. Theoretically, the longer the 
trajectory of the outcome variable is matched, the better the synthetic counterfactual may 
mimic the treated county. I attempt to fit 15 pre-graduation years of rural net income per 
capita when possible for group 3 counties, fit 7 pre-treatment years of net income path for 
group 2 counties, which participated in the aiding poor program in 1994 and graduated in 
2000, and fit 8 pre-graduation years for those that joined the program in 1986 and left in 
1993. I eliminate cases whose net income observations are less than five years before 
graduation.  
To construct the synthetic control, I include available observables such as net 
income, the variable of interest, but supplement these criteria with net income predictors. I 
describe the predictor variables in greater detail in the following paragraph. Since I do not 
have a complete set of data on rural net income per capita and net income predictors for all 
counties, the final number of feasible cases is 7 out of 20 for the first treatment group, 20 
out of 27 for the second treatment group, and 8 out of 14 for the third treatment group.33 
                                                 
32 In individual synthetic control case study, I use the full donor pool to estimate the pre-treatment root mean 
squared errors (RMSE). 
33 I run synthetic control for counties that I can analyze. I will discuss how the number of cases in my sample 
affects the final results in the following section. If I reduce the number of years of outcome variable or 
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The pre-intervention characteristics include outcome variable for 4 years in pre-
treatment period (the first and the last year, and other two middle years) and outcome 
variable’s determinants, average values in pre-treatment period, which includes GDP per 
capita, the ratio of primary industry added value over GDP, fiscal revenue per capita, 
population growth rate, CPI, dummy variables of county types: hilly county, border county, 
pastoral county, minority county and mountainous county. 34,35 I use the aforementioned 
variables to construct the synthetic counties in each group.  
1.5.1 Average Impact of Graduating from National Poor Counties Designation 
To better understanding and comparing the results of long-term impacts of NPCs 
program with the short-term results, I report the overall average results first though they are 
estimated based on the individual synthetic control results. Figure 5 shows that the synthetic 
counterfactual closely matches the treated group in pre-treatment period, and the values of 
net income per capita of treated group are slightly higher than the values of control group in 
seven years after graduation. On average, the treated group has 2 to 85 yuan (RMB) higher 
net income per capita than the synthetic counterfactuals in seven years after graduation, and 
that is a 2.78% annually higher net income per capita in graduated NPCs relative to the 
                                                 
predictors to have more cases, the synthetic counterfactual would not match to the actual outcome; and if the 
synthetic county fails to fit the trajectory of rural net income per capita prior to graduation, then the gap in 
post-graduation net incomes between the real and synthetic counties could simply result from lack of fitness 
and therefore cannot be fully attributed to the lasting effect of the aiding poor program.  
34 The reason for only including 4 years but not all years in pretreatment period is to make sure that other 
predictor variables would receive large enough weights in the weighting matrix V of indicator variables; 
otherwise, using all years renders other predictor variables unimportant (Kaul et al, 2015). Those four years are 
1986, 1989, 1991 and 1993 for cases in group 1; 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000 for cases in group 2; 1986, 1991, 
1996 and 2000 for cases in group 3. 
35 The reason for including the ratio of primary industry added value over GDP as part of predictors is that 
growth in primary sector is more important to reduce poverty than other sectors (Ravallion and Chen, 2007; 
De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2010). The reason for including fiscal revenue per capita is that it is part of the criteria 
of designation and graduation of national poor counties in wave 3. Moreover, the revenue-generating ability of 
local governments is a measurement of whether local governments can provide sustainable supporting funds 
for lasting growth after external aids end.  
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synthetic controls. While, from eight to ten years after graduation, the synthetic 
counterfactual surpasses the treated group, which is due to the fact that I only estimate seven 
years post-treatment effect for group 1 counties which have significantly positive long-term 
effects.36  
1.5.2 Average Impact of Graduation by Class of Participant 
I find heterogeneity in the results across groups, for instance, positive impacts are 
dominated in group 1, but group 2 and group 3 are dominated by significantly negative 
effects. Figure 6.A, 7.A, and 8.A graph the behaviors of the average graduate counties for 
each group compared to their synthetic counterfactuals. The synthetics closely mimic the 
averages in the pre-treatment period, which provides evidence that the constructed 
synthetics are valid counterfactuals for averages. Following treatment, figure 6.A suggests 
that the program created lasting impacts upon net income per capita for graduated NPCs 
from wave 1; the actual average surpasses the synthetic, a difference that grows over time.37 
Seven years after graduation, the net income per capita of the graduate counties is 91% higher 
than it was at the time of graduation, even though the synthetic predicts a 44% increase, had 
the counties not graduated. Figure 6.B presents the significance levels for the results in group 
1. Therefore, the results indicate that the first wave of poverty reduction program, on 
average, caused a statistically significant increase on net income per capita in all seven years 
following graduation, with the exception of the 1st and 2nd years.38  
                                                 
36 I calculate the overall average effects based on the group average. Graduated NPCs in group 3 experience, 
on average, significantly negative long-term effects seven to ten years after graduation. 
37 The actual averages are higher than the synthetic averages seven years after graduation except the 1st year. 
38 The impacts are significant at 10% for all the seven years after those poor counties graduated except the first 
and the second year. 
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In figures 7.A, I observe the synthetic outperforms the actual wave 2 average for the 
first nine years post-graduation, suggesting this wave may have been less effectiveness in 
creating sustainable growth. However, following this period, the actual wave 2 average 
converges to the synthetic but insignificant. For instance, seven years after graduation, the 
net income per capita of the treated counties increases by 42% since graduation, while the 
synthetic counterfactual sees a 53% increase. The negative impact, lower net income per 
capita, of the first, fourth, fifth and sixth year are significant at 10% as can be seen in figure 
7.B. Again, figure 8.A depicts that the average net income per capita for graduate poor 
counties in group 3 are higher than it in synthetic counties after they graduated in the first 
three years and are lower after they graduated for more than three years. Seven years after 
graduation, the net income per capita of the graduate counties is 44% higher than that at the 
time of graduation, although the counterfactual scenario experiences a 65% increase. Those 
impacts are significant at 10% for all years after graduation except the 4th and 5th years. 
Thus, as discussed in above, only counties that graduated from wave 1 significantly 
outperformed, on average, the constructed counterfactual. While counties that graduated in 
2000 performed well or at least the same as the synthetic controls only last for three years 
after graduation.39  
Taken at face value, the above results suggest that only the first wave of poverty 
reduction program, on average, has a positive, lasting impact on net income per capita for 
graduate counties. In addition, the above results are consistent with the results of the gap 
between graduate counties and non-participant counties as well as the results in Chen et al. 
(2009).  
                                                 
39 The long-run effect of the second wave of the program is consistent with the results in Chen et al. (2009); 
the long-term impacts of World Bank’s Southwest Program only last for four years after external aids ended.  
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I offer four possible explanations for the results. First, the criteria for poor counties 
to graduate were more clear and more objective for the first wave of poverty reduction 
program while the criteria were more nebulous and more subjective for the second wave of 
poverty reduction program, which led to the positive, clear average results for counties in 
group 1 and ambiguous results for counties in group 2 and 3.40 Second, political factors like 
lobbying efforts of counties’ government affect the process of designating and graduating 
NPCs. Although designation as a national poor county is not a positive signal for a county 
to attract outside investment, it can receive substantial financial support from central and 
provincial governments. Counties, including qualified NPCs and unqualified counties, have 
the incentive to lobby and influence the decision of NPCs. So, it is politically difficult to 
remove NPCs from the program registry, given that the leaders of those counties have strong 
incentive to fight to retain the access to the generous financial support from governments. 
This may explain why I find some poor counties that had passed the predetermined 
thresholds of poverty still stayed in the program, while some poor counties that had not 
passed the thresholds graduated from the program. Combine the nebulous and subjective 
criteria of graduation in 2000 for NPCs, at the end of the wave 2 of the program; there is 
more space for counties to lobby to affect the decision of counties’ graduation. The really 
poor counties are more likely to be graduated because they may not have enough resources 
like relationships with central and provincial government leaders or money to lobby. Third, 
for counties in group 3 which have received the external aid for 15 years, they may have 
formed the dependence on governments’ disbursement. The higher dependency degree on 
                                                 
40 The criteria of graduation from wave 1 is that net income per capita exceeded 700 RMB in 1992; while the 
criteria of graduation from wave 2 is not only based on net income per capita, but also local GDP per capita, 
poverty headcount, and local fiscal revenue per capita. More details regarding the criteria for the designation of 
poor counties are available upon reqeust.  
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outside funds of poor counties have, the less are likely to improve the efficiency of resources. 
Thus, the positive impacts can only sustain three years for group 3 counties after their 
graduation. Last but not least, even though the received per capita funds from the program 
were similar for counties in each wave, the proportion of the received funds over net income 
per capita were 12.8%, 7.7%, and 6.6% respectively for counties in each wave. The results 
imply that government should reduce the number of NPCs but increase the amount of funds 
for each poor county and then each person in poor counties.      
1.5.3 County-Level Analysis 
In this section, I keep decomposing the long-term impacts of anti-poverty program 
to the county level. Since the results of overall average and group averages are estimated 
based on the individual synthetic control results, I demonstrate the details of the result of 
one treated county first. The three treatment groups have different control groups which 
range from 68 to 170 counties for each case’s donor pool. The donor pool for graduated 
NPCs in the first treatment group are counties that participated in the first wave of the 
program in 1986 and stayed through the second wave; for the second group, donor units are 
counties that entered the second wave of the program in 1994 and stayed through the third 
wave; and my donor units for the third group are counties that have been designated as NPCs 
in 1986, and stayed in the program for 25 years, having never left.   
The units in the donor pool of synthetic control are all NPCs for each sub-group. 
When I use the control to predict Jingtaixian’s rural net income per capita from 1986 to 2000, 
the root mean squared percentage error (RMSPE) is 0.06, or 6 percent. A low score indicates 
that the synthetic control fits the pre-treatment outcome variable accurately. The post-
treatment RMSPE for Jingtaixian from 2001 to 2010 is 0.24, and the ratio of post-treatment 
to pre-treatment RMSPE is 4.03, which is ranked as 2 out of 74, then the p-value for this 
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estimate is 0.027 (2/74), or 2.7%, which implies that the estimated treatment effect is not 
simply due to randomness.  
There is a total of 73 counties in the Jingtaixian donor pool. Comparing the synthetic 
control to the original county in both the pre-treatment and post-treatment, I find that the 
average RMSPE of placebos from 1986 to 2000 is 0.12, which is higher than the RMSPE of 
Jingtaixian, the average RMSPE of placebos from 2001 to 2010 is 0.13, and the average ratio 
of RMSPE is 1.14, which indicates that the treated unit has a higher treatment effect than 
the placebos. 
Figure 9 shows the individual results by each group. I present all cases whose pre-
treatment rural net income per capita trajectories are matched with a synthetic control group. 
Each figure graphs the poor county that graduated solid lines and displays their synthetic 
counterparts with dash lines. Figure 10 presents the placebo tests that further strengthen my 
findings. In each panel, the bold line depicts the treated county and the thinner lines the 
placebos. The vertical axis represents the difference in the rural net income per capita 
between the treated (or the placebo) and its synthetic control. I identify a significant positive 
effect if the thick curve is higher than most thin lines post-treatment and an adverse effect 
if lower. I also calculate RMSPE and p-value for each case as in Table 5. 
The results for graduated NPCs in group 1 are reported in Figure 9.A (synthetic 
control results) and Figure 10.A (placebo tests). Luoyuanxian, Anxixian, Pinghexian, and 
Linquxian are examples of a positive, robust long-run impact of anti-poverty program. For 
example, seven years after graduation, net income per capita is about 36% higher than that 
of the constructed counterfactual in Luoyuanxian, 52% in Anxixian, 71% in Pinghexian, and 
68% in Linquxian. The placebo tests show that the synthetic control results are robust. The 
effect in the treated county is above all of the placebos. However, Gaolanxian and 
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Zhengningxian have lower income level relative to the synthetic control one to seven years 
after graduation, and none of them is robust to placebo test. Yiyuanxian provides a mixed 
empirical result with lower net income per capita relative to the synthetic control in the first 
four years after graduation and then rebounding to a higher level relative to the 
counterfactual. That rebound to a positive effect in five years weakens the causal link to anti-
poverty program.  
The synthetic control and placebo test results for group 2 are summarized in Figure 
9.B and Figure 10.B. Seven counties (Xifengxian, Xiaanxian, Yichuanxian, Mianchixian, 
Qinyuanxian, Tengchongxian, and Zhongxian) fare better than their synthetic controls, with 
the range of 8% to 24% and 14% to 41%, lower than the percentages (36% to 71%) in group 
1, higher net income per capita relative to that of counterfactuals seven and ten years after 
graduation. Only the positive impact of Qinyuanxian is robust to placebo tests. Kedongxian, 
Mingshuixian, and Qinggangxian are examples of long-run negative effect with 46%, 55%, 
and 37% lower income level than their synthetic controls seven years after graduation, and 
60%, 42%, and 30% lower in ten years. The above effects are all robust to the placebo tests. 
Moreover, Wenxian, Xiaxian, and Xiangyunxian are examples of negative effects, but 
without strong support from the placebo tests. The rest of seven counties (Fenggangxian, 
Tunchangxian, Yixian, Wanrongxian, Moudingxian, Binchuanxian, and Shipingxian) have 
mixed impacts with either from positive to negative or from negative to positive impacts.  
The individual results for graduated NPCs in group 3 are presented in Figure 9.C 
(synthetic control results) and Figure 10.C (placebo tests). Luoshanxian and Lantianxian are 
examples of positive impact after graduation. Net income per capita is 9% and 29% higher 
than synthetic controls for Luoshanxian and Lantianxian ten years after graduation, but only 
the positive impact of Lantianxian is robust to the placebo testing results. Net income per 
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capita of Jingtaixian and Yongdengxian are both 28% lower than that of constructed 
counterfactuals ten years after graduation. Those negative effects are both robust to placebo 
tests.  Jingyuanxian, Qinxian, Fuhaixian, and Muleihasakezizhixian have mixed impacts after 
graduation and all rebound from positive to negative effects. 
Summing up, most of the graduate counties fare no worse than their synthetic 
controls after graduation, only 10 out of 35 counties have negative impacts, of which only 5 
(3 in group 2 and 2 in group 3) are robust to their placebo tests. Moreover, if I only consider 
the significant cases which are significant at the 10% level in Table 5, there are only four (2 
in both group 2 and 3) adverse effect cases.  
The non-negative impacts imply that counties are generally able to sustain growth in 
net income per capita after the external aid ends and are less likely to return to poverty. Once 
the treated unit graduates from the program, then it would have less available capital, but it 
may reach higher efficiency of the limited capital after several years’ accumulation in the 
program relative to the synthetic unit. This is possible because of the increase in growth 
capacity resulted from the poverty reduction program within the disbursement period. More 
specifically, the increased local public goods like education, infrastructures, irrigation and 
farmland water conservancy project and health system, which the poverty reduction program 
ostensibly improves, attribute to the improvement in growth capacity. Chen et al. (2009) 
explain   that the increased local public goods create a higher marginal product of private 
capital, and attract more private investment supported by increased savings rate from private 
sector under the assumption of imperfect capital market in poor counties.41 In this case, the 
net income would raise with the increased local public goods through a higher marginal 
                                                 
41 Figur 2 shows that the treated group has higher average resident savings balance, resident savings balance 
per capita and the ratio of resident savings balance/GDP. The mean value of resident savings balance per capita 
and the ratio of resident savings balance/GDP increased from 1993 to 2000.  
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product of investment even after the external disbursement ended. If the graduate counties’ 
governments implement the poverty reduction program inefficiently, for instance, the local 
governments allocated the poverty funds to revenue-producing projects rather than other 
growth-oriented activities (Rozelle et al, 1998), the precautious saving will decrease with the 
cessation of external disbursements and then it will lead to failing economic performance, 
relative to the counties that still receive external aid.   
1.5.4 Alternative Counterfactual Robustness 
I use counties that never participate in the program as an alternative control group 
to contruct synthetic counterfactuals for graduated NPCs. Though the new control group 
with characteristics in pre-tretment are less similar to the graduated NPCs as the ungraduated 
NPCs,  they can also provide comparisions for the treated group if the conctructed synthetic 
controls closely match the treated counties. In this case, the interpolation bias is hard to 
avoid. Figure 11 provide the average effects for the three groups respectively. The results of 
average effects for the three groups are similar to the results of original control group.42 In 
the long-term, graduated NPCs in group 1, on average, have positive impacts; while, 
graduated NPCs in group 2 and group 3 averagely experience negative effect.   
1.6 Conclusion 
The success of poverty reduction in China has attracted worldwide attention. Several 
Asian and African countries hope to replicate the success of China in reducing poverty. 
Before other countries replicate China’s poverty reduction program, policy-makers must 
fully understand the long- and short-term causal effects of the program. Specifically, it is 
                                                 
42 The individual synthetic control results are similar to the individual results of the original regressions in the 
previous section. The graphs for the individual results are available upon request.  
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imperative to determine whether poverty reduction program generates sustainable, long-
lasting development. Although a number of papers have measured the short-term effects of 
China’s national poverty reduction program, none analyzed the post-graduation performance 
of the recipient counties. Positive long-term effects are one of the substantial goals of the 
program and play an important role in reducing poverty in the long-run.  
This article fills the gap by using synthetic control to find whether poor counties 
sustain income growth following the graduation or return to poverty. I estimate the long-
term effects of the first two waves of poverty reduction program case by case from 1986 to 
2010. I also follow Cavallo et al. (2013) to estimate the overall average effects for all treated 
counties and sub-groups. I find that China’s anti-poverty program had a nonnegative impact 
on net income per capita, at least. However, I find a lot of heterogeneity in the results across 
counties and time. Only five graduate counties show that they were unable to keep the pace 
of growth as they would have if they had not left the program, and the results are robust to 
their placebo tests. Heterogeneity in impacts implies that poverty reduction program does 
not have a long-term positive effect for every poor county as they were estimated in short-
term average. In groups, only counties that graduated in 1993 are, on average, able to have a 
higher net income per capita than they witnessed in the counterfactuals. Counties that 
graduated in 2000 performed better than or at least the same as the synthetic units, on 
average, only for three years after graduation. The results imply that only the first wave of 
the poverty reduction program has a demonstrable, positive, lasting impact on net income 
per capita for poor counties that graduated in 1993; the nonnegative impacts of the second 
wave of the program only last for three years after poor counties’ graduation in 2000. 
Constrained by a bad fit or data unavailability, I cannot analyze all treated counties. 
If a county is omitted due to poor fit, the above results still present unbiased estimates of 
33 
 
the poverty reduction program’s causal effect. If a county is omitted due to data limitation, 
then the overall average effect would suffer from upward bias, because the treated counties 
without sufficient data tend to be poorer. Though the overall average effects may be biased 
due to missing treated counties, the synthetic control for individual case studies still captures 
the causal effect of poverty reduction program in China in the long-run.  Future research on 
China’s poverty reduction program should pay attention to analyze why certain counties 
experience negative long-run effect; test whether the dependence on external aids exists in 
poor counties which have benefited from the outside funds several years but remained poor; 
and identify methods to improve the long-run effects of poverty reduction program.  
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Table 1. Three sub-groups of the treated group 
 
Notes: Designated status for group1, P-G-G, means that the status of graduated NPCs in 
group 1 is participated during the first wave, and graduated in the second and third wave. 
Similarly, the status of graduated NPCs in group 2 is not participated during the first wave, 
participated in the second wave, and graduated in the third wave; the status of graduated 
NPCs in group 3 is participated during the first and second wave, and graduated in the third 








Designated status during 
the three waves of the 
program (1-2-3) 
Group 1 1986 1993 20 P-G-G 
Group 2 1994 2000 27 NP-P-G 
Group 3 1986 2000 14 P-P-G 
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 (1)-(2) (3)-(4) 
GDP per capita 0.74 0.81  0.43 0.68 
 0.40 0.65  0.62 0.76  0.31*** -0.22*** 
Population 47.41 269  38.60 131.2 
 38.22 141.21  40.93 26.82  8.81*** -2.71* 
Area per capita 701 4,736  362 1,685 
 364 1,750  351 1,263  339*** 12.85 
Fisca revenue per 
capita 501 1,164  330 1,099 
 




added value/GDP 0.35 2.06  0.37 0.16 
 




balance per capita 4,402 3,846  2,616 2,545 
 
2,481 2,471  3,478 2,825  
1786*** 
-997.68*** 
Net income per capita 2,711 1,442  1,582 882 
 1,482 773  2,199 1,209  1130*** -716.78*** 
Hilly county 0.27 0.44  0.20 0.40 
 0.18 0.39  0.29 0.45  0.07*** -0.11*** 
Border county 0.05 0.21  0.06 0.24 
 0.07 0.25  0.04 0.20  -0.02*** 0.02*** 
Pastoral county 0.12 0.33  0.15 0.36 
 0.15 0.35  0.18 0.39  -0.03*** -0.04*** 
Minority county 0.23 0.42  0.42 0.49 
 0.46 0.50  0.23 0.42  -0.19*** 0.23*** 
Mountainous county 0.33 0.47  0.64 0.48 
 0.65 0.48  0.56 0.50  -0.32*** 0.09*** 
CPI 0.86 0.30  0.87 0.30 
 0.87 0.31  0.86 0.30  -0.03 0.01 
National poor county 
(1986-1993) 0 0  0.47 0.50 
 
0.45 0.50  0.58 0.49  
 
 
National poor county 
(1994-2000) 0 0  0.85 0.36 
 
0.86 0.35  0.78 0.41  
 
 
National poor county 
(2001-2010) 0 0  0.86 0.35 
 
1 0  0.03 0.18  
 
 
Sources: Calculated from data in China County (City) Social and Economic Statistical Yearbook (1996, 
2000-2011), China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy (2000-2011), China County Statistical 
Yearbook (1980-1991), China rural statistical yearbook (1987-2011), China’s Ethnic Statistical Yearbook 
(1987-2011) as well as provincial yearbooks, cities’ yearbooks, and counties’ yearbooks. 
Notes: Number of observations vary between 13,000 and 22,675 for Non-participant counties, between 
9,173 and 16,088 for NPCs, between 8,181 and 13,773 for ungraduated NPCs, and between 1,137 and 
2,315 for Graduated NPCs. Non-participant counties are counties that never have been designated as 
the NPCs. GDP per capita, fiscal revenue per capita, citizen savings balance per capita, and net income 
per capita values are based on 2000 constant prices. GDP per capita (ten thousand RMB), Population 
(ten thousand), Land areas per capita (square kilometer per ten thousand people), Fiscal revenue per 
capita (RMB), Primary industry added value/GDP (%), Citizen savings balance per capita (RMB), Net 




Table 3. Classification of counties and effects 
 
 Intervention Treated counties Comparison Estimation 
Short-run 
effect 





Park et al. (2002); Meng 
(2013); Qin and Chong 
(2016); Figure 3 
Long-run 
effect 
Participating in the 
program and then 






















Table 4. 5×5 Transition matrix for relative income level ranks of NPCs from 1986 to 1992 
 1992 
 
 Bottom Second Third Fourth Top 
1986 
Bottom 0.74 0.16 0.05 0 0.05 
Second 0.15 0.45 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Third 0.11 0.17 0.33 0.11 0.28 
Fourth 0 0.21 0.42 0.26 0.11 
Top 0 0 0.11 0.56 0.33 
Notes: This table reports the probabilities of net income per capita ranks transition for NPCs 
from 1986 to 1992. The bottom, second, third, fourth, top in the quintile matrix measure the 
































Group 1: 1986-1993 
                   
Luoyuanxian 0.09 0.2 2.14 78 0.07 0.18 4.07 46 0.58 + 
Anxixian 0.06 0.26 4.34 78 0.07 0.18 3.85 28 0.35 + 
Pinghexian 0.07 0.28 4.09 78 0.07 0.19 3.91 28 0.35 + 
Gaolanxian 0.05 0.26 5.29 68 0.08 0.2 3.46 16 0.23 - 
Zhengningxian 0.02 0.01 4.06 68 0.08 0.2 3.28 20 0.29 - 
Linquxian 
0.08 0.3 3.89 69 0.07 0.2 4.28 27 0.39 + 
Yiyuanxian 0.08 0.12 1.62 69 0.07 0.2 4.23 50 0.71 0 
Group 1 average          + 
Group 2: 1994-2000 
                  
Xifengxian 
0.04 0.09 2.33 
153 
0.07 0.17 3.5 
71 0.46 + 
Fenggangxian 
0.13 0.15 1.22 
153 
0.07 0.17 3.43 
115 0.75 0 
Tunchangxian 
0.1 0.14 1.43 
153 
0.07 0.16 3.42 
108 0.7 0 
Yixian 0.05 0.06 1.26 153 0.07 0.16 3.45 112 0.73 0 
Kedongxian 0.1 1.12 11.14 154 0.07 0.17 3.48 10 0.06 - 
Mingshuixian 0.09 0.81 9.31 154 0.07 0.17 3.44 11 0.07 - 
Qinggangxian 0.19 0.52 2.7 154 0.07 0.17 3.54 64 0.41 - 
Xinanxian 0.02 0.08 4.36 154 0.07 0.17 3.51 32 0.21 + 
Yichuanxian 0.03 0.09 2.82 154 0.07 0.17 3.44 63 0.41 + 
Mianchixian 0.04 0.07 1.64 154 0.07 0.17 3.48 99 0.64 + 
Qinyuanxian 0.06 0.23 3.6 154 0.07 0.17 3.46 102 0.66 + 
Wanrongxian 0.06 0.14 2.29 154 
0.07 0.16 3.33 
71 0.46 0 
Wenxian 0.06 0.2 3.54 154 0.07 0.17 3.44 45 0.29 - 
Xiaxian 0.06 0.22 3.69 154 0.07 0.17 3.35 39 0.25 - 
Tengchongxian 0.01 0.14 9.93 154 0.07 0.17 3.49 11 0.07 + 
Moudingxian 0.08 0.03 0.44 154 0.07 0.17 3.43 150 0.97 0 
Binchuanxian 0.03 0.18 5.63 154 0.07 0.16 3.57 22 0.14 0 
Xiangyunxian 0.03 0.08 3.04 154 
0.07 0.17 3.46 
59 0.38 - 
Shipingxian 0.14 0.11 0.77 154 
0.07 0.17 3.35 
128 0.83 0 
Zhongxian 0.02 0.1 6.7 170 0.05 0.16 6.01 34 0.2 
+ 
Group 2 average          
- 
Group 3: 1986-2000 
                  
Jingtaixian 0.06 0.24 4.03 73 0.12 0.13 1.14 2 0.03 - 
Jingyunxian 0.03 0.17 5.38 73 0.12 0.13 1.13 1 0.01 0 
Yongdengxian 0.1 0.29 3.1 73 0.12 0.13 1.1 5 0.07 - 
Luoshanxian 0.03 0.05 2.02 129 0.08 0.13 2.41 51 0.39 + 
Qinxian 0.13 0.38 2.83 72 0.13 0.14 1.12 5 0.07 0 
Lantianxian 0.15 0.17 1.14 108 0.09 0.12 1.67 59 0.54 + 
Fuhaixian 0.04 0.09 1.99 130 0.05 0.13 4.75 90 0.69 0 
39 
 
Muleihasakezizhixian 0.07 0.12 1.57 162 0.05 0.12 5.21 119 0.73 0 
Group 3 average          - 
Notes: “+” indicates positive impact, which means that the treated values are larger than the synthetic 
values after the poor counties graduate from the program for most years; ”-” indicates negative 
impact, which means that the treated values are smaller than the synthetic values after the poor 
counties graduate the program for most years; “0” indicates mixed (no obvious positive or negative) 
impacts , which means that the treated values are sometimes larger than and sometimes smaller than 
the synthetic values after the graduated NPCs leave the program. a. The pre-treatment RMSPE is 
very high for the synthetic of Kedongxian in Heilongjiang province, so I exclude out this case from 
















Figure 3. Rural net income per capital from 1986 to 2010 
 
Notes: Non-participant counties are counties that never have been designated as NPCs. 

























































































































































Figure 4.C Group 3: Gap between graduated NPCs and non-participants
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Average Net Income Per Capita
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Figure 6. Average net income per capita and significance levels for graduated NPCs in 
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Figure 7. Average net income per capita and significance levels for graduated NPCs in 
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Figure 8. Average net income per capita and significance levels for graduated NPCs in 
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Figure 9. Synthetic control results for counties participated in the poverty reduction 
program  
Panel A Synthetic control results for counties participated in the poverty reduction 
program in 1986 and graduated in 1993 (group 1) 
Panel B Synthetic control results for counties participated in the poverty reduction 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C Synthetic control results for counties participated in the poverty reduction program 


























































































































































































Figure 10. Placebo test results for counties participated in the poverty reduction program 
Panel A Placebo test results for counties participated in the poverty reduction program 
in1986 and graduated in 1993 (group 1) 
 
Panel B Placebo test results for counties participated in the poverty reduction program 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel C Placebo test results for counties participated in the poverty reduction program 
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Chapter 2. Education as Opportunity? The Causal Effect of Education 
on Labor Market Outcomes in Jordan 
2.1 Introduction 
Rapid gains in education without corresponding improvements in job prospects have 
been cited as one of the leading causes of the Arab Spring (Campante and Chor, 2012). 
Several nations across the Middle East and North Africa region have experienced remarkable 
expansions in educational attainment over the past three decades without correspondingly 
large economic gains in the labor market. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is no 
exception. Despite having the 9th largest increase in years of education around the globe 
from 1980 to 2010, today the nation exhibits double-digit unemployment rates (15% for men 
and 33% for women), a female labor force participation rate around 15%, and a wage 
premium for higher education lower than that for secondary school completion. Like many 
of its neighbors, Jordan underwent protests during the Arab Spring in 2011 and continued 
weakness in the labor market remains a catalyst for new demonstrations taking place in 2018. 
In this paper we analyze the labor market effects of recent educational reforms in 
Jordan which extended the length of compulsory schooling. Although compliance with the 
compulsory schooling reform was imperfect, our fuzzy regression discontinuity designs 
estimates suggest that the 1988 educational reform increased schooling attainment among 
the population obtaining an educational degree by nearly a quarter of a year in the first year, 
and implementation improved gradually in the years after.43 Our estimates suggest that the 
additional education is responsible for a small increase in the probability of entering the 
                                                 
43 The average increase in educational attainment differs depending on whether the sample includes graduates 
with secondary and higher degrees. While compulsory preparatory schooling was lengthened by a year, this 
only impacted attainment for those stopping with this as a terminal degree, as secondary school (which was 
non-compulsory) was concurrently shortened from 3 to 2 years. 
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workforce and being employed, an increase in the use of self-employment, and gains in hours 
worked and wages. 
We disaggregate these gains by gender, showing that the impacts on Jordanians at 
the time of their entrance into the labor market of additional schooling are significantly larger 
for women, particularly on the extensive margin. Males instead realize gains in hours worked, 
which is consistent with the fact that nearly all men already participate in the labor market in 
by their mid-20s. Exploiting novel features of our data to analyze affected cohorts at later 
points in their life, we then show that the labor market gains realized by males appear to 
engage more strongly over this window and to benefit both at the intensive and extensive 
margin over the course of their careers. 
Analysis of schooling reform in Jordan presents particularly interesting case study for 
a number of reasons. First, while many of the causal studies of education in the empirical 
economics literature have relied on extensions to compulsory schooling or changes to school 
leaving age laws, this research has demonstrated heterogeneous effects. Some papers have 
found positive, significant, and sizeable estimates of the returns to schooling (Oreopoulos, 
2006, 2007), while other studies have uncovered contexts in which the return to schooling 
appears to have been either quite low or even zero (Albouy and Lequien, 2008; Pischke, and 
Wachter, 2008). These variations highlight the sizeable degree to which educational 
investments exhibit heterogeneous returns across settings and time. Furthermore, research 
has historically been focused primarily on high income settings, for example, studying 
reforms in the United States or Europe, which are largely secular educational systems. Less 
is known about how well the estimates produced in these studies generalize to regions, 
particularly those in the developing world, with dramatically different curricula and 
60 
 
educational agendas with non-standard objective functions, as well as under different sets of 
economic conditions and societal norms of behavior.  
Our work also relates to a number of papers which have examined the causal impact 
of education on non-labor market outcomes. For example, studies have demonstrated an 
impact of increased education on the probability of voting (Milligan et al., 2004), health and 
mortality (Silles, 2009; Kippersluis et al., 2010; Powdthavee, 2010), teenage childbearing 
(Black et al., 2008; Silles, 2011), and intergenerational human capital accumulation 
(Oreopoulos, 2006; Assaad and Saleh, 2016).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
background on the economy as well as on the history of education reform in Jordan. Section 
3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 details our empirical strategy. Section 5 
presents results for the impact of education on labor market outcomes both initially and over 
the life cycle. Section 6 presents a series of robustness checks regarding the empirical strategy 
and data assumptions. Section 7 concludes. 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 The Government and Economy of Jordan 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan gained independence as a hereditary 
constitutional monarchy from the British in 1946. Jordan’s economy in the post-
independence period has been affected by regional instability and conflict, including a series 
of international conflicts with Israel (1948/1949 First Arab Israeli War; 1967 Six Day War; 
1967-1970 War of Attrition; 1973 October War) and domestically, through confrontations 
with the PLO, most notably the events surrounding Black September which persisted from 
1970 to 1971 (Robbins, 2004). By comparison, our study period which spans education and 
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labor market participation in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s has been one of relative  stability 
for the county. As of the mid 2010s, the nation again finds itself front and center in a refugee 
crisis, with inflows from socio-economic and political turbulence in neighboring countries. 
These periods of conflict have complicated provision of education in Jordan, as large 
refugee populations have sporadically entered Jordan. Notably, during the 1948 Palestinian 
Exodus – some 250,000 to 300,000 Palestinians arrived in Jordan, with smaller migration 
flows continuing over the period 1949-1956 and again another quarter million individuals 
fled the West Bank and Gaza for Jordan during the 1967 Exodus. As Jordan did not have a 
sizeable population of Sephardi or Mizrahi, it also did not experience a similar outmigration 
during the corresponding Jewish exodus from Arab countries from 1948 into the 1970s, such 
as that from Yemen, Libya, or Iraq. Periodic inflows of population both strained resources 
and acted as catalyst for the expansion of educational infrastructure in the state. Today 
Jordan is home to the second largest refugee population in the world on a per capita basis. 
These inflows, coupled with high fertility rates, have led to a rapid population expansion in 
the country, with some of the largest gains in the urban centers such as Amman. 
Economically, Jordan is still considered a developing nation. The economy expanded 
rapidly from the 1970s through the mid-1980s, with GDP growth often exceeding 10% a 
year. Jordan has occasionally been labelled a rentier state because of its large reliance on 
external support. This pattern peaked in the 1970s when dramatically increased aid flows 
arrived from a boom in Middle East oil revenues. These began to decline in late 1980s saw 
a decline in culminating in a federal debt crisis. Slower growth returned in the 1990s, 
accelerating into the 2000s, and today, Jordan has a per capita income of roughly $4,000 PPP. 
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In spite of the economic progress over the period, unemployment in the country has 
remained relatively high. 
2.2.2 Educational Reforms in Jordan 
A number of elements make Jordan a novel setting in which to examine educational 
reform. Having only existed as a formal polity for around 70 years, the country is still in the 
process of defining and shaping its educational policy as well as expanding access to and 
resources for the educational system. While seen as a strong performer in comparison to 
peers in the MENA Region, Jordan is still rather unique for the sheer volume of refugee 
flows with which the country has had to cope. Driven by conflicts in surrounding countries, 
Jordan is now second only to Lebanon for refugees on a per capita basis, with particularly 
large Palestinian and Syrian populations. 
The Educational reform law of 1952 established education as a right of every 
Jordanian citizen and introduced compulsory schooling for a period of 7 years (this was 
subsequently reduced to 6 years in the 1954/1955 school year). Education Law no. 16 of 
1964 extended schooling to 9 years (known at the time as preparatory school) as compulsory 
and ushered in a broad expansion to education - including more schools, more teachers, 
increased teacher training, and a unified philosophy of education (Abbas, 2012). This reform 
would ultimately have to cope with a large increase in demand for schooling, given large 
numbers of Palestinians arriving from the West Bank into Jordan in the aftermath of the 6 
day war in 1967.  
In this paper, we focus on the impact of provisional Education Act No. 27 in 1988 
whose primary effect was to increase free compulsory schooling from 9 to 10 years (renamed 
from Preparatory to Basic education). All children 6 years and older are required to attend 
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school and must continue through ten years of basic education (Hodges, 2005). While the 
previous reforms are larger increases in years of education, two things complicate the analysis 
of their impact on labor market outcomes. First, they were implemented gradually as a result 
of limited state resources for education, and second, they occurred far enough in the past 
that many respondents in the Census and EUS surveys affected by the reforms may have 
exited the labor market at the time survey. 
Compulsory schooling in Jordan is equivalent in duration to completing primary 
school in the U.S. as well as two years of high school. After completing Basic education, 
students are eligible to enter secondary school. Prior to the reform, secondary school was 
heterogeneous in nature and lasted 3 years. After the reform, a “new secondary” program 
was implemented which standardized the curriculum, created specific tracks of study, and 
decreased the length of secondary school to 2 years. This means that the combined effect of 
Education Act No. 27 was to change the nature of secondary school, but not to alter the 
total number of years required to reach a secondary degree before and after the reform. The 
next significant revision to the educational system would not occur until 1994, when 
Educational Act No. 3 reformed the philosophy and objectives of education in the county.  
2.3 Data and Strategy 
We combine data from multiple sources in our analysis. Individual level educational 
attainment and labor force outcomes are derived both from the 2004 Jordanian Census 
(IPUMS, 2018) as well as from the Jordanian Employment and Unemployment Surveys 
(EUS) for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2014, and 2016. The 2004 Census is a 
nationally representative, stratified, 10%, sample of the Jordanian population, representing 
about half a million individuals. Estimates from the Department of Statistics report a 
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response rate of 95.9%. The EUS are representative at both the national and governate level, 
and are conducted quarterly. We employed the full set of harmonized EUS compiled and 
disseminated by the Economic Research Forum (OAMDI, 2017).  
Table 6 presents summary statistics for our Census sample. 44  Panel A contains 
individual level demographics and work outcomes. At the time of enumeration for the 2004 
census, the mean individual in the sample is 30 years old, roughly 65% of males are married; 
while roughly 76% of women are married, reflecting an earlier average age of marriage and 
child birth for women. Astoundingly, in this age group over 90% of males participate in the 
labor force, while roughly 30% of women participate. These reflect prime working age in the 
country as both values are significantly higher than for the population at large.  Marriage and 
large families are common. Roughly three-quarters of women have married by age 30, and 
for older cohorts this rises above 90%. While the total fertility rate in Jordan has declined 
since the 1980s when it exceeded 7, it remains high enough for population growth at 3.3 
today (WB, 2018). 
The 2004 Jordanian Census recorded educational outcomes for those who have 
completed their education as a categorical variable divided into bins. Figure 12 depicts 
educational attainment for individuals born in birth cohorts ranging from 1967 to 1980.45 As 
can be seen from the upper right and lower left panels of the figure, a visible discontinuity 
occurs from the 1973 to 1974 birth cohorts. It is this forced jump in education attainment 
we exploit to derive causal estimates of educational attainment. It is also clear that the 
transition from Preparatory to Basic education did not completely transition from one cohort 
                                                 
44 Corresponding summary statistics for the EUS sample are available upon request. 
45 We present these figures for a wide band which we use in some robustness checks and which we believe 
provides useful context on the pre and post reform trends in educational attainment in the country. By the 
nature of our empirical approach, we typically examine narrower intervals around the educational reform. 
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to the next. It is for this reason that we adopt a fuzzy regression discontinuity designs 
strategy. We consider a number of explanations for the imperfect adjustment ranging from 
incomplete compliance with the compulsory schooling rule, to insufficient resources to 
implement the reform, to survey response error in Section 5.1.  
Figure 12 presents mean years of education for individuals in our sample frame who 
have completed any degree. There are no visibly large discontinuities in the share of the 
population attaining secondary or higher education after the reform as well; suggesting the 
increase in education we study is predominantly confined to the impact of increasing the 
duration of compulsory years from 9 to 10. As discussed in Section 2, at the same time that 
the reform increased the duration of basic compulsory education, it reduced the duration of 
secondary school by 1 year, meaning that all higher degrees such as secondary, masters, and 
bachelor’s degrees still represented the same number of years of educational attainment. 
Panel B of Table 1 contains summary statistics on educational attainment for our sample. 
The two samples generally paint a similar picture of the Jordanian population, with 
a few nuances worth pointing out. First, the EUS waves begin in 2006 and run through 2016, 
so they observe our birth cohorts of interest across a series of later points in their lives. 
Second, the EUS surveys contain additional information on wages, which we discuss and 
examine in more detail in Section 5.3. A third interesting difference is that the EUS sample 
suggests 41% of males and 56% of women work in the public sector. In the census the 
corresponding numbers are 35 and 30%. Some of this difference may be attributable to how 
the questions are worded, and government statistics suggest the EUS numbers are closer to 
reality, with women disproportionately seeking the public sector over the private. 
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Anecdotally, public sector employment is often considered more socially acceptable for 
women.   
To assess the availability of educational resources surrounding the reform, we 
compile a number of statistics from disparate sources. First, using data on the date of 
construction for the corpus of schools in Jordan from Ministry of Education’s 2010 Census 
of Schools in Jordan, we retrospectively construct the number of schools present in each 
district in each year following the general approach of Assaad and Saleh (2016). From annual 
statistical yearbooks, we complement data on the number of schools with information on 
the total number of teachers and pupils in the country. This data allows us to construct 
average values for the number of teachers per school, students per school, and the 
teacher/pupil ratio at a regional level over time – a set of proxies for the evolution of 
educational resources and demands on the educational system. 
2.4 Empirical Strategy 
2.4.1 Methodology 
As discussed in Section 2, the educational reform extended de jure years of 
compulsory schooling in Jordan from nine to ten, which theoretically should create a 
discontinuity in years of education attained across cohorts. In practice, de facto enforcement 
of the new Basic, 10-year, compulsory schooling was imperfect, with some individuals still 
only attaining nine years of schooling. Nevertheless, compliance was still significant enough 
to generate the discontinuity visible in Figures 12 and 13, and it is this development that we 
exploit to examine the causal impact of educational on labor market outcomes. 
From an econometric standpoint, these nuances of the data means that the 
treatment, 𝑇𝑖 – an additional year of completed required schooling – is determined only in 
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part by the value of a forcing variable, 𝑥𝑖 , cohort of birth, since when an individual was born 
determines whether they were exposed to the schooling reform. Even with imperfect 
compliance, it is possible to study the causal impact of education reform using regression 
discontinuity approaches as long as the probability of treatment is discontinuous at a cutoff 
point, denoted by 𝑥0. As can be seen in Figure 12, there is a discrete break in educational 
attainment across the 1973 and 1974 birth cohorts in which roughly half of the typical 
population attaining preparatory suddenly began attaining basic instead. And as discussed 
previously, the fraction of the population attaining other degrees exhibits no large 
discontinuities around this time threshold.  
 We thus employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity designs to evaluate the impact of 
increased educational attainment resulting from the 1988/1989 school reforms.46 Following 
Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we assign 𝑇𝑖 = 1 when individual i receives an additional year 
of schooling and 𝑇𝑖 = 0 when they do not. Probability of assignment to the treatment is 
then given by: 
Pr(𝑇𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) = E(𝑇𝑖|𝑥𝑖)                                                  (1) 







E(𝑇𝑖|𝑥𝑖)                                         (2) 
when the probability of treatment is discontinuous at the threshold 𝑥0. We further 
denote 𝑦0𝑖  to be the outcome if individual i has not been treated and 𝑦1𝑖  be the treated 
outcome for individual i. Given 𝑦𝑖 as an observed outcome, it can be expressed as follows: 
                                                 
46 Regression discontinuity designs were first introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960), while Hahn 
et al., (2001) contributed the key theoretical framework and concepts for the application of fuzzy RD designs. 
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𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖𝑇𝑖                                                                   (3) 
where 𝛼𝑖 = 𝑦0𝑖  and 𝜌𝑖 = 𝑦1𝑖 − 𝑦0𝑖 . In this setup, 𝜌𝑖  is the treatment effect for 
individual i.  However, in practice, we never observe 𝑦1𝑖 and 𝑦0𝑖 together. Instead, we can 
estimate the average effect of the treatment and derive the treatment effect 𝜌 over our sub-
population of interest.  
An essential property for clean identification is that the conditional mean function 
E(𝛼𝑖|𝑥𝑖)  is continuous at 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥0 . Stated differently, our fuzzy RD designs approach 
requires that in the absence of the reform, average outcomes would otherwise be similar for 
individuals just below the cutoff in comparison to those just above the cutoff. As long as 














E(𝑇𝑖|𝑥𝑖))           (4) 











                                    (5) 
where 𝜌 provides an estimate of the local average treatment effect. In analysis, we 
revisit this assumption and discuss its plausibility in the context of this particular Jordanian 
educational reform. We also present several robustness checks along this dimension. 
The estimation of the average treatment effect 𝜌  is typically a nonparametric 
regression problem. However, Imbens and Lemieux (2008) show that bias for the simple 
kernel estimator when one non-parametrically estimates a regression function in the interior 
of the support is relatively high and is related to the bandwidth h. One practical solution to 
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this issue is a local linear regression (Fan and Gijbels, 1996; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). In 
a fuzzy RD designs, using a local linear regression with a uniform kernel is comparable, under 
certain conditions, to obtaining the treatment effect via a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
approach.47 This equivalency also holds when we include additional covariates as discussed 
in the subsequent analysis (Hahn et al. 2001; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Calonico, et al., 
2018). 
While the theoretical treatment above describes the case of fuzzy regression 
discontinuity designs for an indicator treatment variable for simplicity, it also holds in a 
continuous setting. The existing literature on the evaluation of compulsory schooling 
changes have widely used a measure of treatment intensity, namely years of education as their 
measure of treatment assignment (Albouy and Lequien, 2009; Van Kippersluis et al., 2011; 
Ali and Gurmu, 2016). We follow this approach as it has the advantage of being directly 
comparable with pre-existing research and because using variable intensity allows us to more 
easily interpret the marginal effect of schooling on labor market outcomes. 
In our 2SLS approach, we use an indicator for the introduction of the 10 year 
compulsory schooling reform, 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖
= 1(𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥0), and the first order polynomial 
interaction of the reform with birth cohorts as a set of instruments. The first stage equation 
is given,  
         𝑇𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽2𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖
∗ 𝑥𝑖           (6) 
+𝒁𝑑𝑡𝚪 +  𝛀𝒅 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                                                 
47 Formally, it works when the same bandwidth is employed for the estimation of the conditional expectation 
of the outcome variable and for the conditional expectation of the treatment variable on both sides of the 
threshold, which is the case in our analysis. 
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and, similarly, the reduced form equation is 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝜃 + 𝜋1𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖
+ 𝜋2𝑥𝑖 + 𝜋3𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖
∗ 𝑥𝑖   (7) 
+𝒁𝑑𝑡𝚪 + 𝛀𝒅 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 
where i indexes individuals.48 𝑌𝑖 is our labor market outcomes of interest, which we 
vary by specification - labor force participation, employment status, an indicator for self-
employment, and hours worked per week.49 Zdt represents a vector of time variant district 
and governate specific controls, which we include to help isolate the impact of any correlated 
investments in the educational system from the impact of the additional year of schooling. 
Ωd is a vector of district fixed effects, and where d indexes districts.  
Omitted factors are a concern when they are (a) heterogeneous across districts, (b) 
time-variant, and (c) potentially correlated with the implementation of the compulsory 
schooling component of the reform. Other educational investments occurring concurrently 
with the compulsory schooling extension are a first order candidate. As detailed in Section 
3, we attempt to mitigate this issue with the inclusion of fixed effects and by controlling for 
the per capita stock of same gender or co-ed schools in the district, as well as governate level 
student-teacher and class unit-teacher ratios.  
2.4.2 Bandwidth selection 
The selection of bandwidth in regression continuity designs presents a tradeoff 
between bias and variance. A wider bandwidth may have a larger bias because more 
observations are far from the cutoff, but it will have lower variance because it can employ a 
                                                 




49 All outcomes observed at the time of survey enumeration: 2004 for the Census; various years for the EUS. 
Further details can be found in the table notes. 
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larger number of observations. We take two approaches for selecting an appropriate 
bandwidth. First, we use a cross-validation procedure based on mean-square error to let the 
data suggest a bandwidth for each outcome variable (Calonico, 2016). Across the outcomes, 
this technique produces bandwidths which range from 4 to 7 years.  
As a second approach, we consider narrower ranges of birth cohorts on a 
theoretically basis. One issue with allowing for a comparison across more years is that 
individuals become less and less comparable with time. Factors such as cohort effects and 
macroeconomic conditions at the time of entry in the labor market have more scope to vary. 
Perhaps most importantly, other impacts of the Education Act No. 27 in 1988 beyond the 
compulsory schooling law itself would, over longer time horizons, have had time to have an 
impact. This could include the reformed structure and content of secondary school as well 
as any additional educational investments over the period such as school building, teacher 
training or hiring. 
Several things are worth noting in this regard. First, anecdotally, the most commonly 
documented impact of the reform was the extension of compulsory schooling and the 
curricula/structural reforms in secondary school. Second, there were no other major 
educational reforms in the years immediately preceding or following the 1988/1989 reforms. 
The closest reform occurred in 1994, a year during which a new unified educational 
philosophy was issued. Using our preferred bandwidth, 4 years, excludes individuals exposed 
to this reform, and even using a longer bandwidth of 7 years would still only include 
individuals exposed to the new reform in the final 2 of their 10 years of education. In the 
analysis, we present results for 4 years as the bandwidth, and then run robustness checks 
using a range from 3 to 7 years. In all analysis, we employ the same bandwidth for the 
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outcome and treatment regressions and the same bandwidth length on either side of the 
reform.  
2.4.3 A graphical exploration 
As a first pass, it is useful to examine how years of education vary over time in 
relation to the educational reform. Figure 13 plots years of education across Jordanian birth 
cohorts using the 2004 Census. A discontinuity in the average years of education is visible 
between those born in 1973 and 1974.50 There is a discernable increase in years of education 
completed by individuals born after 1973 who attended 10 years compulsory schooling 
(those affected by the 1988/1989 compulsory schooling reform) compared to individuals 
born in 1973 and earlier years. This increase is on the order of about one-fifth of a year of 
education for the entire cohort.  
This jump in years of education is consistent with the evidence we have previously 
presented in two ways. First, the educational attainment of roughly 70% of the population 
would not be expected to change by the reform. This is because about 5% of the Jordanian 
population either never attended or completed any formal schooling (and were thus not 
impacted), while about 10% completed no more than primary before and after the reform, 
and about 50% completed secondary degrees or higher (recall from the previous discussion 
that the total years of attainment were unaffected for this group as well). The only affected 
group should have been those stopping education at the preparatory level, a group 
                                                 
50 The dots in Figure 2 represent the unconditional mean of years of education for each birth cohort group 
and the solid lines represent fitted quadratic regression lines with confidence intervals. 
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comprising about 30% of the population. And within this population, only about half were 
impacted by the Basic reform.51  
2.4.4 First-stage estimates 
Table 7 presents the first-stage OLS estimates for the sample of male, female, and 
both. It indicates that the 1988/1989 compulsory schooling reform increased the average 
years of education of individuals by between two and three months depending on whether 
the cohort trends are specified as linear or quadratic. Even though the coefficients on reform 
indicator are similar and significant in both models, but the linear model has the lowest value 
of AIC.52  
Based on AIC, we choose to present results from the linear model as the baseline 
model and simply run alternative specifications of the cohort trends as robustness check. 
For the separate samples of male and female, coefficients on reform also have similar 
magnitudes for both linear and quadratic models, and again, the linear regressions still 
produce lower AIC value than the quadratic models. Those coefficients indicate that the 
1988 reform increased the average years of schooling of females and males by about one to 
two months as well as three to four months respectively.  
                                                 
51 In the diagram and the analysis, we exclude individuals with less than primary educational attainment. We do 
this primarily because estimates of the return to an additional year of school for these individuals, many of 
whom are illiterate, are unlikely to be representative of that for the reform in question which expanded 
schooling only among higher attainment levels. We explore alternative subpopulations of educational 
attainment groups as robustness checks in the next section.   
52 The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is a test of model selection to balance the tradeoff between goodness 
of fit and simplicity of the model. It equals to twice of the difference between the number of estimated 
parameters and the value of log of maximum likelihood function at the optimal. The optimal model is the one 




2.5.1 Schooling and Engagement with the Labor Market 
Table 8 presents the results from the fuzzy regression discontinuity designs 
specification described in equations 6 and 7, using a 4 year window on either side of the 
1988/1989 reform (including only birth cohorts spanning 1970 to 1977), and employing a 
liner functional form with interactions as discussed in Section 4.1. Each row and column 
represent an individual regression, all of which contain district fixed effects. The first four 
columns provide estimates of labor market status in a sample of individuals from the 2004 
Census, while the remaining columns use a pooled sample drawn from the closest EUS 
waves temporally, 2006 and 2007.53 These regressions additionally control for a flexible set 
of polynomials in age to account for the fact that individuals are observed at different times 
since graduation in each wave. 
Panel A presents estimates for both men and women together, while Panel B and C 
isolate the sample of men and women respectively. Columns (1) and (5) present estimates of 
the impact of an additional year of compulsory schooling on labor market participation.  
Looking first at the full sample, the coefficient of an additional year of education on labor 
force participation is estimated to be positive and significant at 0.032, suggesting that each 
additional year of schooling is associated with a 3.2% point increase in the likelihood an 
individual participates in the labor force.  
Given a mean labor force participation rate of 64.1%, each additional year of 
schooling would then be associated with a roughly 5% increase in labor force participation. 
In practice, because compliance with the actual reform was limited, these estimates imply 
                                                 
53 We discuss the reasoning behind this approach in Section 5.2. 
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that in the first year of its implementation, the roughly 0.2 year increase in schooling would 
have increased labor force participation by about 0.6 percentage points (a 1% gain).  The 
results for employment status in columns (2) and (6) generally mirror those for labor force 
participation as well.  
As can be seen from Panels B and C, these impacts are driven predominantly by 
women entering the labor force and being more likely to be employed with the additional 
education. This is both unsurprising and surprising. It is unsurprising because nearly all males 
participate in the labor market, so there is not a large scope for additional education to 
increase this. Incredibly, in the age groups in our regression sample, over 95% of males 
engage in the labor market and between 85 and 90% work.54 At the same time, it is surprising 
to observe because social norms operate to constrain women’s opportunities for economic 
participation in Jordan. 
Columns (3) and (7) present the impact of additional schooling on self-employment. 
An extra year of education is associated with a small increase in self-employment, largely 
driven by males. Similarly, columns (4) and (8) demonstrate an increase in hours worked 
resulting from an additional year of schooling, driven entirely by males. That we observe 
such a large impact on the intensive margin rather than the extensive margin for males makes 
intuitive sense given that nearly all males already participate in the labor force.  
Contrasting the two samples produces additional insights. While the Census and the 
EUS survey estimates are relatively close for the overall labor force impacts and for females, 
the EUS yields generally larger statistics for the impact of education on male labor force 
                                                 
54 The estimate for male labor force participation is one location where the Census and EUS results diverge 
slightly, with the impact on LFP of males larger in the EUS and close to zero in Census.  
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participation, employment status, and hours worked respectively. One consideration is that 
the EUS provides a snapshot of individuals slightly later in life, and we provide hypotheses 
and explore this feature of the data in more detail in the following section. 
2.5.2 Education and Labor Market Outcomes over the Life Cycle  
The 2004 Census captures individuals on either side of the 1988/1989, meaning we 
observe individuals with an average 30 years of age, plus or minus the bandwidth we select. 
A novel feature of using the Employment and Unemployment Surveys to also examine this 
question is that we have snapshots of the same cohorts of individuals at later periods of their 
life.  Patterns of labor market outcomes over the life cycle are very different for men and 
women over time in Jordan. These are depicted in Figures 14 and 15 respectively across 
cross-sections of the population observed in four of the EUS waves. 
We focus first on Figure 14. By age 20, roughly 70% of males are in the labor force. 
Nearly all males are working by 23, and this rate plateaus for men until about age 35. At 
which point, it begins to decline slowly over the life-cycle. By age 40 it has fallen about 5% 
points and by age 50 it has declined to a level between 60 and 70%. 
This pattern is remarkably different than that for women. As can be seen in Figure 
15, women enter the labor force at roughly the same age as men, although only 30 to 40% 
of them enter at this point (in a promising trend, the highest levels of female labor force 
entrance are observed in the most recent EUS waves). This is where the similarities end. 
Female labor force participation peaks at 23, and unlike for men where it plateaus, it 
immediately begins declining at this point. By age 30, about a quarter of those who entered 




These patterns likely could reflect the influence of market factors including higher 
rates of unemployment for women and lower wages, although these differences are not 
especially large while the different life cycle patterns are striking. Indeed, the stark patterns 
are probably more consistent with a set of strong social pressures for women to marry, have 
children, and provide non-market labor within the household which raise the opportunity 
cost of remaining in the labor force as women age (which may also manifest in a perceived 
lack of acceptability of engaging in the labor market).  
To examine this further, we utilize the EUS in yet another way in Table 9. Here we 
run our fuzzy RD designs to examine the causal impact of an additional year of schooling 
from the 1988/1989 reforms in the first two available waves of the EUS 2006 and 2007 and 
contrast that with those form the 2014 and 2016 EUS waves. The first five columns 
reproduce those from Table 8, and we observe patterns similar to the Census where extensive 
margin labor force and employment gains are large for women from the schooling reform. 
Gains for men exist but are smaller, and we actually see large intensive margin gains for men 
in terms of hours worked. This is consistent with the patterns we observed in Figures 14 and 
15. Men and women are both induced to engage more heavily with the market at this earlier 
stage of their life (around age 32), just along different margins.  
When we turn to the last set of columns, the labor force participation gains for 
women are essentially estimated to be similar as in Census, while those for men are more 
than four times larger. The same is true for employment. This suggests that the additional 
schooling may have helped men remain in the labor market.  
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2.6 Discussion and Robustness 
2.6.1 Functional Form of the RD Specification 
In this section we explore the robustness of our empirical specification to alternative 
econometric modeling choices. Section 4.4 discussed the first stage results of the impact of 
the change to compulsory schooling on years of educational attainment. In our analysis, we 
used a parametric model with a linear polynomial functional form with treatment interaction 
terms -- on the basis that it produced lower AIC values than those for the quadratic models. 
In Table 10, we replicate these baseline estimates in Panel B following this approach. Panels 
A, C, and D, present the results if we instead use a linear, quadratic, or quadratic interaction 
approach respectively. With the exception of small changes in the estimated impact on wages, 
the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar regardless of specification, suggesting 
that the choice of functional form for the regression discontinuity is not a first order concern 
in this setting.  
A second econometric concern is that a number of our labor market outcomes of 
interest are constructed as binary variables – including labor force participation, employment 
status, and our indicator for self-employment. A typically raised issue when conducting 
analysis on a binary dependent variable is that if this structure is not directly modeled, 
regression estimates are capable of generating predictions outside the range of 0 to 1. As a 
robustness check, IV Probiit specification reproduces the results of Table 8. Reassuringly, in 




2.6.2 Alternative Definitions of the Treatment Population 
Arguably, the creation of Basic education in 1988 should have had by far the largest 
impact within the population of individuals who were previously electing to stop school at 
the end of preparatory education (9 years). In theory, individuals who were stopping school 
earlier, such as at the end of the 6 year window (primary) or who had preprimary or lower 
educational attainment could have been induced to stay in school longer by the reform act.55 
This would be the case if, for example, the reform been perceived to increase educational 
quality and individuals expected this to translate into better labor market outcomes.  
In practice, this change seems unlikely in the case of 1988 Jordan for a number of 
reasons. First, slow implementation of the new Basic program suggests that many schools 
may not even have immediately known or been capable of enacting the reform. This suggests 
that most students and parents would likely have been even worse informed of the reform 
and its repercussions. Second, the share of the population leaving school before reaching 9 
years of education exhibited no visible discontinuity. If individuals were induced to stay in 
school longer, we might expect to see a more rapid increase in years of educational 
attainment. It is still possible however that the addition of another year of school in the 
regular curriculum may have increased earlier dropout, as the time cost associated with 
obtaining the regular school age stopping degree had been increased.56  
                                                 
55 It is also possible that the introduction of the 10th year of compulsory education impacted the decision to 
attend secondary school or to continue in the educational system beyond ten years into a master’s or bachelor’s 
degree in the university system. Although plausible, rigidities in the Jordanian educational system limit the scope 
for individual and household responses to this change because entrance into secondary school tracks are based 
on relative performance in the classroom, and acceptance into public universities are based on a competitive 
exam. 
56 While it is possible that both forces could have operated and offset one another, the empirical strategy in 
Section 4 should be relatively robust to this case. This is because the reform was implemented shortly after 
being passed, and thus there was not a large period of time in which households would have been able to 
forecast this change. This means that individuals in the sample only learned of the change to compulsory 
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When we include all individuals, even those who are illiterate or do not complete 
primary school. In all cases, coefficient magnitudes decrease slightly, yet remain significant 
and quite similar to those from our main specification in Table 8. This would be as expected 
since the addition of a larger “untreated” population into the analysis should introduce noise 
and attenuate the coefficients. 
2.6.3 Robustness to Bandwidth Selection 
As discussed in Section 4.2, the selection of bandwidth presents a tradeoff between 
bias and variance. We elected to present results for a 4 year bandwidth following intuition 
and both empirical selection procedures. Nevertheless, should unobserved educational 
investments not captured by our time variant measures of schools per capita and teachers 
per capita have occurred in the sample period, in longer bandwidth specifications, these 
could bias our coefficients in either direction depending on whether these investments were 
positively or negatively correlated with compliance with the new basic requirements.57 We 
present the primary results for bandwidths of 3, 4, 5, and 7 years in upon request. Fortunately, 
the primary results are not incredibly sensitive to our choice of bandwidth. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This paper studies the causal impact of an educational reform in Jordan during the 
1988 to 1989 school year which extended years of compulsory schooling from nine to ten. 
Our analysis suggests that additional schooling in the late 1980s induced more men and 
women to enter the labor force participation, raised their chances of finding employment, 
and boosted wages. Gains were larger in the intensive margin for men, who realized increased 
                                                 
schooling in the final few years of their preparatory education, at which time many of the early dropouts would 
have already left school or decided not to enroll in the first place. 
57 Furthermore, the estimates we produce should then be interpreted as the net impact of these other overall 
educational reforms enacted in the period, not of schooling alone. 
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in hours worked as a result. These patterns provide some evidence that educational 
improvements can still translate into stronger labor markets, but also highlight the strength 
of traditional gender norms in Jordanian society. Institutions and norms sometimes evolve 
slowly, and the broader impact of even temporary improvements in labor market 
participation may be larger than observed today, such as influences on future generations. 
To this extent, future research may explore factors which affect the extent to which these 
norms and institutional forces dictate the health of the Jordanian labor market and prospects 
for female employment.  
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Table 6. Census Summary Statistics  
 Full Sample   Men   Women 
Panel A: Individual 
Characteristics Obs Mean 
 Std. 
Dev.   Obs Mean 
 Std. 
Dev.   Obs Mean 
 Std. 
Dev. 
Age 101,728 30.06 4.00 
 51,441 30.03 4.01  50,287 30.08 3.99 
Married 101,728 0.70 0.46 
 51,441 0.65 0.48  50,287 0.76 0.42 
Number of children 101,728 1.87 1.99 
 51,441 1.43 1.74  50,287 2.33 2.12 
Age at first birth of child 60,729 24.05 4.17  26,455 26.33 3.48  34,274 22.30 3.80 
Labor force participation 101,728 0.62 0.49 
 51,441 0.93 0.26  50,287 0.31 0.46 
Employed 101,728 0.49 0.50 
 51,441 0.80 0.40  50,287 0.17 0.37 
Self employeda 63,155 0.09 0.29 
 47,750 0.12 0.32  15,405 0.01 0.12 
Public sector employeea 63,155 0.33 0.47 
 47,750 0.35 0.48  15,405 0.30 0.46 
Hours workeda 
48,512 48.91 13.95  40,167 50.14 14.21  8,345 42.98 
10.7
9 
            
Panel B: Educational 
Characteristics 
                      
Mean years of schoolingb 94,460 11.56 2.98 
 47,719 11.40 3.04  46,741 11.72 3 
Educational Attainment 
           
Primary (6 years) 101,728 0.08 0.27  51,441 0.09 0.29  50,287 0.07 0.26 
Preparatory (9 years) 101,728 0.20 0.40 
 51,441 0.22 0.41  50,287 0.19 0.39 
Basic (10 years) 101,728 0.10 0.30 
 51,441 0.12 0.32  50,287 0.09 0.29 
Old Secondary (12 years) 101,728 0.11 0.32 
 51,441 0.12 0.32  50,287 0.11 0.32 
New Secondary (12 years) 101,728 0.14 0.34 
 51,441 0.14 0.34  50,287 0.14 0.34 
Bachelors or More 101,728 0.29 0.45  51,441 0.25 0.44  50,287 0.32 0.47 
            
Panel C: Household 
Characteristics 
                      
Family size 101,728 5.80 2.71 
 51,441 5.66 2.79  50,287 5.94 2.61 
Own home 101,728 0.78 0.41 
 51,441 0.78 0.41  50,287 0.78 0.42 
Polygamous household 101,728 0.01 0.10 
 51,441 0.01 0.09  50,287 0.01 0.12 
Urban residence 101,728 0.78 0.41 
 51,441 0.78 0.41  50,287 0.78 0.42 
            
Notes: Full sample of individuals borth between 1967 and 1980. Sample excludes the illiterate, individuals with an 
indeterminate age, current students, and individuals who migrated into Jordan after school starting age (age 6). Mean years of 
schooling imputed using educational attainment, time to degree based on birth cohort, and length of degree program in years. 
(a) Percentages calculated among those in the labor force. (b) Among those with at least primary attainment.Source: Author's 





Table 7. First Stage - The Impact of the Compulsory Schooling Reform on Years of 
Education 
 
Linear  Quadratic 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  Full Sample Men Women   Full Sample Men Women 
Reform Indicator 0.192*** 0.114 0.270***  0.261** 0.168 0.353** 
 (0.053) (0.076) (0.072)  (0.105) (0.153) (0.145) 
Birth Cohort -0.015 -0.007 -0.024  -0.084 -0.044 -0.120 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.022)  (0.091) (0.132) (0.126) 
Birth Cohort Squared     -0.014 -0.007 -0.019 
     (0.018) (0.026) (0.025) 
Reform * Cohort 0.081*** 0.060* 0.107***  0.146 0.048 0.241* 
 (0.022) (0.032) (0.031)  (0.106) (0.154) (0.146) 
Reform * Cohort Squared    0.015 0.024 0.006 
     (0.025) (0.036) (0.034) 
Number of observations 54,056 27,285 26,771  54,056 27,285 26,771 
AIC 268374 136914 131267  268378 136918 131270 
                
Notes: Sample as described in Table 1, restricted to those with at least 6 years of completed education and 
born between 1970 and 1977.  
Source: Author's calculations using 2004 Jordanian Census (IPUMS). 





Table 8. The Effects of the 1988/1989 Jordanian Educational Reform on Labor Market 
Outcomes 
 Census  Employment and Unemployment Survey 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 













Years of Education 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.012*** 0.641***  0.034*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 3.689*** 44.852*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.107)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.314) (2.445) 
           
Mean of Dep Var. 0.641 0.521 0.060 48.92 
 
0.571 0.526 0.033 44.78 231.8 
Number of 
Observations 
54,056 54,056 54,056 27,622  44,777 44,777 44,777 23,534 23,437 
           
Panel B: Males                    
Years of Education 0.003* 0.004 0.024*** 1.562***  0.031*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 6.755*** 61.405*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.137)  (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.532) (3.812) 
           
Mean of Dep Var. 0.967 0.857 0.114 50.12 
 
0.950 0.895 0.064 46.17 234.9 
Number of 
Observations 
27,285 27,285 27,285 22,959  21,746 21,746 21,746 19,473 19,412 
           
Panel C: Females                    
Years of Education 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.004*** -0.207  0.073*** 0.061*** 0.003*** -0.106 36.481*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.358)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.571) (3.991) 
           
Mean of Dep Var. 0.308 0.178 0.005 43.02 
 
0.214 0.176 0.005 38.09 216.7 
Number of 
Observations 
26,771 26,771 26,771 4,663  23,031 23,031 23,031 4,061 4,025 
           
Age and Age 
Squared 
NA NA NA NA  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth Cohort 
Polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Notes: Fuzzy RD designs (2SLS regression) estimates including linear interaction terms. Sample as described in Table 1, restricted to those with at least 6 
years of completed education and born between 1970 and 1977.  
 
Source: Author's calculations using 2004 Jordanian Census (IPUMS) and the 2006 and 2007 EUS Surveys (ERF). 





Table 9. Short vs. Long-Term Effects of Educational Attainment on Labor Market 
Outcomes in Jordan 
 
EUS 2006 and 2007  
 EUS 2014 and 2016 

















0.039*** 0.035*** 0.014*** 3.276*** 41.567***  0.076*** 0.076*** -0.000 -3.754*** 70.439*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.310) (2.443)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.341) (5.719) 
            
Panel B: 
Males 
                     
Years of 
Education 
0.026*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 5.857*** 55.850***  0.121*** 0.129*** -0.001 -0.922*** 69.619*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.505) (3.727)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.330) (7.305) 
            
Panel C: 
Females 
                     
Years of 
Education 
0.078*** 0.068*** 0.003*** 0.646 45.171***  0.079*** 0.074*** 0.002* 2.356*** 21.502** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.641) (5.190)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.867) (10.737) 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth 
Cohort 
Polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District 
Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Notes: Fuzzy RD designs (2SLS regression) estimates including linear interaction terms. Sample as described in Table 1, restricted to those with at least 6 years of 
completed education and born between 1971 and 1976.  
 
Source: Author's calculations using the 2006, 2007, 2014, and 2016 EUS Surveys (ERF). 





Table 10. Sensitivity to Functional Forms of the Regression Discontinuity Design 
 Census  Employment and Unemployment Survey 
















0.031*** 0.032*** 0.013*** 0.648***  0.035*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 3.720*** 45.037*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.107)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.315) (2.455) 




                   
Years of 
Education 
0.032*** 0.032*** 0.012*** 0.641***  0.034*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 3.689*** 44.852*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.107)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.314) (2.445) 
           
Panel C: 
Quadratic 
                   
Years of 
Education 
0.032*** 0.032*** 0.013*** 0.642***  0.035*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 3.687*** 44.860*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.107)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.314) (2.446) 




                   
Years of 
Education 
0.032*** 0.032*** 0.012*** 0.641***  0.035*** 0.030*** 0.013*** 3.692*** 44.828*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.107)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.314) (2.444) 
           
Age and Age 
Squared 
NA NA NA NA  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth Cohort 
Polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District 
Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Notes: Fuzzy RD designs (2SLS regression) estimates including linear interaction terms. Sample as described in Table 1, restricted to those 
with at least 6 years of completed education and born between 1970 and 1977.  
 
Source: Author's calculations using 2004 Jordanian Census (IPUMS) and the 2006 and 2007 EUS Surveys (ERF). 
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The Impact of Educational Reform in 1988/1989
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Figure 3: Male Labor Market Engagement over the Life Cycle
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Chapter 3. Sweet Child O’ Mine: Son Preference in the United States 
3.1 Introduction 
Son preference has been found in many Asian countries like China, India, Korea, 
and Vietnam. (Arnold and Liu, 1986; Gupta, 1987; Aly et al., 1991; Haughton and 
Haughton, 1998; Edlund, 1999; Das Gupta et al., 2003; Jayachandran and Pande, 2017). 
Studies show that parents in these countries exhibit favoritism for sons over daughters 
both before and after birth, with consequences ranging from higher fertility, to imbalanced 
sex ratios, to gender discrimination. Some research has begun to extend the analysis to 
other countries, such as South Africa, Canada, UK, and the U.S. (Gangadharan and Maitra, 
2003; Dubuc and Coleman, 2007; Dahl and Moretti, 2008; Abrevaya, 2009; Almond, 
2013).  
In the case of the U.S., existing studies have yielded some inconsistencies.58 Dahl 
and Moretti (2008) find that parents in the U.S. prefer boys, while Abrevaya (2009) finds 
no evidence of son preference in the United States in aggregate. Instead, son preference is 
only documented for Chinese and Indian immigrant’s sub-populations. More recently, 
Blau et al. (2017) show that having a daughter first is associated with lower fertility for the 
overall population. Much of the difference may stem from methodology. For instance, 
Dahl and Moretti (2008) present indirect evidence of son preference among parents in the 
U.S. by estimating the effects of child gender on mothers’ marital status and family 
structure using the 1960 to 2000 U.S. Censuses. They find that a first-born girl is less likely 
to live with her father relative to a first-born boy due to the mother’s lower probability of 
                                                 
58 In Canada, the first-generation immigrants from South and East Asia tend to have stronger son preference 
than the second-generation immigrants, but when the first-generation immigrants are separated into two 
groups, arriving before and after age 18, there is no significant difference among them for son preference 
(Almond, 2013).  
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getting married, higher probability of being divorced, and a father’s lower likelihood of 
obtaining custody of daughters. Abrevaya (2009) provides evidence of gender selection 
among parents who migrate from Asia like China, India, and South Korea using vital 
statistics from Federal and California from 1970 to 2005 and census data (1980, 1990, and 
2000) to estimate the boy-birth percentage at later births according to the dimensions of 
parents’ source countries and previous genders.  
Even though son preference is inconsistent at the aggregate level, evidence that 
immigrants from Asian countries exhibit son preference in the U.S. is more robust. 
Despite the relative size of this group, accounting for 7% of the overall population in this 
study, little research attention has been devoted to examining the formation and the extent 
to which these preferences persist within U.S. society.  
On the one hand, studies show that son preferences can change with the social 
values over time in Japan and South Korea. (Kureishi and Wakabayashi, 2011; Choi and 
Hwang, 2015) Similarly, studies like Blau et al. (2008) find intergenerational assimilation 
of immigrants to native levels for fertility, education, and labor supply. Bleakley and Chin 
(2010) find that greater English proficiency of immigrants, estimated by using immigrants’ 
age at the time of arrival in the U.S. as IV, leads to more assimilation to U.S. behaviors, 
including a higher probability of divorce and intermarriage and a less likelihood to live in 
ethnic enclaves. Thus, we might expect that the son preference among Asian immigrants 
may change with the process of their assimilation in the U.S.  
On the other hand, evidence suggests that not all culture characteristics of 
immigrants can be so easily assimilated even with longer duration of residence in the U.S. 
For instance, Hicks et al. (2015) find that gender norms of behavior in the allocation of 
household is acquired in childhood, and once established, is relatively unaffected by 
96 
 
duration of exposure to U.S. culture. Therefore, there is a critical period for the age of 
migration which affects the effect of assimilation on the persistence of gender norms of 
immigrants, and also might affect immigrants’ other cultural markers with applications.   
I present two analyses in this article using American Community Survey data from 
2012 to 2016. First, I estimate whether parents in the U.S. have son preference in aggregate 
and across immigrant populations, and then I extend the analysis to higher birth orders 
for large size families, and further I extend the estimation to the indirect mechanism 
through the effects of the gender of children on mothers’ marital status. Second, I analyze 
whether son preference among immigrants from South and East Asian countries are 
assimilated by the local community in the U.S. over time, contrasting groups of first-
generation and higher order generation immigrants, as well as contrasting son preference 
across mothers with different age of arrival to the U.S and with different duration of 
residence in the U.S. before the birth of their first child.  
In the analysis, I use whether the family had another child within six years as a 
dependent variable to test for son preference via a fertility stopping mechanism. In theory, 
if parents prefer sons rather than daughters, then the likelihood of having additional 
children should be higher for families with daughters only than for families with sons only. 
I find that for both small size and large size families, there is no evidence of son preference 
in the U.S. at large. Additionally, I use whether the next child is a boy as another dependent 
variable to test son preference through a gender selection mechanism.59 Results again show 
that there is no significant evidence of gender selection in aggregate in the U.S.  
                                                 
59 The means for gender selection include three types of options, the first type covers infanticide and child 
abandonment which usually occur after children’s birth and the gender of children is observed; the second 
type is abortion which happens before the birth of a baby but after the formation of a fetus. Abortion access 
is available mainly due to the introduction of ultrasound and amniocentesis, which can identify the gender 
of a fetus, in the 1970s; the last type includes in vitro fertilization (IVF) and sperm sorting which are 
97 
 
As robustness, I run a proportional hazard function model as it provides additional 
information on son preference by exploiting the complete set of variation in birth spacing 
across children. Another advantage of this model is it doesn’t require a complete family 
sample, so mothers in the sample are not restricted to the age between 18 and 40 
(Haughton and Haughton, 1998). The results of Cox Proportional Hazards model are 
consistent with the previous analysis.  
Next, I turn to son preference among immigrants who migrated from Asian 
countries. I start from the estimation of son preference among the first-generation 
immigrants and then separate sub-populations based on country of origin. I also construct 
a control group which contains immigrants from G7 countries.60 I find that, relative to 
natives and relative to G7 immigrants, parents who migrate from Asian countries show 
stronger son preference, both among small and large size families, and this occurs through 
both mechanisms previously described – fertility stopping and gender selection. 
Furthermore, the results show that parents from China, India, and Vietnam have son 
preference while those from Japan and Korea do not. When I consider the higher order 
generation immigrants, only parents from India still have son preference, while immigrants 
from China and Vietnam are completely assimilated by the external environment. 
Finally, using a differences-in-differences methodology, I compare the fertility as 
well as gender selection decisions of immigrants with daughters only and sons only arriving 
in the U.S. before and after the critical period of assimilation (here taken to be around age 
9).61 I find that fertility and gender selection decisions are particularly skewed along parents 
                                                 
performed before pregnancy. They are processed on the fertilized embryos to obtain the desired gender and 
then transferred into mother’s uterus to form the fetus. (Abrevaya, 2009; Almond, 2013) 
60  G7 countries consist of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. 
61 The “critical period” of assimilation is derived from the linguistic hypothesis, the critical period of language 
acquisition. It suggests that people are more easily to be proficient in a language and its grammatical structure 
98 
 
who migrated after the critical period. This strongly suggests that exposure to home 
country norms regarding son preference in a period of development at a young age is 
critical for developing son bias.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the sample 
and data summary. Section 3 explains the regression model. Section 4 discusses the results. 
Section 5 extends the regressions to the use of hazard model for the completed sample, 
indirect evidence for son preference in the U.S., and the formation and assimilation of son 
preference. Conclusions are given in Section 6.   
3.2 Sample and Data Summary 
The American Community Survey (ACS) is conducted yearly and includes 
information on education, housing, jobs, immigration and other demographic 
characteristics.62 Data are available at the individual level with the identifiers linking to the 
structure of family and household. I employ the 2012-2016 ACS 5-year Public Use 
Microdata Sample (PUMS) data. It contains all cases from the previous 1% ACS samples 
for 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, and reflects approximately 5% of the US 
population.63  
I define a family in this analysis as a married mother with an eldest child at the age 
of 12 or younger. To avoid the problem that some of children may have left the household, 
I limit mother’s age to between 18 and 40 in the sample. 64  Both of these choices 
                                                 
in childhood, so people who migrate early in life to the U.S. tend to learn and speak English more fluently 
relative to those immigrants arriving later in life. This hypothesis has been applied in many studies to analyze 
the process of assimilation of immigrants. (Bleakley and Chin, 2004, 2010; Hicks et al., 2015). 
62 The American Community Survey includes questions not asked in the regular census. Response to the 
survey is required by law Title 18 U.S.C Section 3571 and Section 3559, which amends Title 13 U.S.C. 
Section 221. 
63 The primary difference between the 2010 census and the 2012-2016 ACS file for the purpose of this paper 
is the availability of detailed information on immigration and household structure. 
64 Results are still robust when I use higher tail of 45 or 50.  
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dramatically limit the chance that sample selection and attrition would drive the results 
observed. 
The resulting sample size for families with at least one child is 490,858.65 Among 
that, household size, on average, is 3.99, and the sample size for households with only one 
child is 175,675, with two children are 213,854, and with more than two children is 
101,329. Summary statistics are presented in Table 11. 62% of mothers are in the labor 
force and are 92% fathers working. Almost 93% of mothers attain a high school education 
or above and 46% of mothers have at least a bachelor’s degree. Education attainment for 
fathers, at 89% and 39%, are lower than mothers. In the sample, 30% of families have 
only daughters, and 32% of households have only sons. The rest, 38% of families, have 
both daughters and sons. 20% of families have a foreign-born mother, and 35% of them 
are from the South, East, and Southeast Asia.   
Individual age is reported for each household member. Using this information, I 
construct birth order for children in a family and record the gender of the child at each 
order of birth. Further, I additionally construct variables for whether the family had 
another child and whether the family had another male child.66  
The ACS provides information on each individual’s place of birth, allowing us to 
define the first-generation immigrants and where they are from. First, I decompose the 
sample into natives and first-generation immigrants to estimate son preference separately 
for these two groups. Second, I break the first-generation immigrant groups into people 
                                                 
65 The unit of observation is household.  
66 In this article, I concern both the two children and three children families. When I estimate the son 
preference for the second child, families with twins of the first two children and triples are excluded out. 
When I estimated the son preference for the third child, families with twins of the second and third child as 
well as triples are excluded out.  
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who migrated from G7 countries and South, East, and Southeast Asian countries.67 As the 
ACS also contains information on each person’s ancestry and race, I define higher-order 
generations of immigrants of South, East, and Southeast Asian (hereafter SE Asian) as 
natives who claim their ancestry are from South, East, and Southeast Asia or as individuals 
who speak a specific Asian language at home or who claim themselves having at least one 
third of race of a specific Asia country.  
Finally, for first-generation immigrants, year of entry is available. I use this variable 
to test whether the son preferences among SE Asian immigrants change with age at the 
time of arriving in the U.S., which measures the extent of social assimilation of immigrants. 
3.3 Analysis 
3.3.1 Baseline Regression 
I begin the analysis within the following econometric framework:   
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖 +  𝑋𝑖Γ +  𝜀𝑖                                   (1) 
where i denotes married women between the age of 18 and 40 with at least one 
child, 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖 is a dummy variable indicating the gender of previous children as being 
all female, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of control variables, 𝜀𝑖 is the error term, 𝛽s are the coefficients, 
and specifically, 𝛽1 is the parameter of interest.  
I consider two dependent variables of interest: 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 , indicating whether 
family i had additional children within six years, and Male child𝑖, indicating whether the 
next child is a son.68 For the “had second child” sample, I include families with at least one 
                                                 
67 All countries and regions in South, East, and Southeast of Asia are considered once they are recorded in 
ACS. It includes China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka. 
68 By using five-year or seven-year window, I get similar results for the regressions.   
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child, so if they had a second child within six years after the first child’s birth, 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 
equals 1, otherwise it is 0. Similarly, in the “had third child” sample, I consider families 
with two and above children. If they have a third child within six years of the birth of the 
second child, then the dependent variable, 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖, would take the value 1. For another 
dependent variable, Male child𝑖, it takes the value 1 when the additional child is male.
69 
The predicted values of having another child and whether the next child is a boy estimated 
by the Linear Probability Model (LPM), are predominantly ranged between 0 and 1.70 
 The parameter of interest is the coefficient on 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖, an indicator variable 
assigned 1 when the previous children are all girls in family i. The coefficient indicates the 
difference in 𝑌𝑖 between families with all girls and those with at least one son. Arguably, it 
should provide an upper bound of the effects of son preference on family size because 
some families may have additional children to balance the gender pool of their children – 
an effect not due to son preference. To rule out that concern, in some specifically, I 
additionally control for 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑖 , which indicates the gender of previous children contains 
both boy and girl, in the following regression equation. 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑖 +  𝑋𝑖Γ +  𝜇𝑖                            (2) 
Once this additional indicator is included, the omitted category is that for a group 
of families with only boys. Thus, the coefficients on 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖  and 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑖  indicate the 
difference between families with all girls or families with children of both sexes in 
comparison to the fertility of those with only sons. 
 The vector of control variables, 𝑋𝑖, are standard to the literature on fertility and 
son preference in general, and contain variables that relate to the mother, household 
                                                 
69 There is no six-year window for dependent variable, Male child𝑖 . 
70 98% of the predicted values are between 0 and 1.  
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variables, and geographic variable.71 The maternal variables include whether the mother 
has high school and above education, whether the mother has at least a bachelor’s degree, 
mother’s age, and mother’s age at marriage. Household variables include family income, 
father’s education attainment captured by dummy variables for high school and above as 
well as bachelor’s degree and above, and whether the head of household is male. I also 
include the geographic indicator, state dummies, to control for an influence of regional 
factors on families’ son preference, like differences in state level access to abortion or 
differences in regional locations of ethnic enclaves.  
I use a linear probability model with robust standard errors to estimate the above 
equations since the two dependent variables are both dummy variables. The coefficients 
of control variables can be interpreted as the change in the probability of having another 
child within the six-year window and the next child being a boy respectively. Meanwhile, 
I run a Cox Hazard regression as a robustness check and also provide additional evidence 
for son preference. For the hazard function, I don’t limit the age of the mother in the 
sample to between 18 and 40. Thus, I have a larger sample for the hazard regression.  
3.3.2 Immigrant Assimilation  
Studies on son preference among Asian immigrants typically produce consistent 
and positive results, indicating son preference in the US for these groups. A set of 
important unanswered question is when during life one develops this son preference, 
whether it can be still developed in the U.S. among local enclave populations, and whether 
son preference among Asian immigrants vanishes when they have resided in the U.S. for 
a long time.  
                                                 
71 Haughton and Haughton (1998) illustrate that those factors also affect families’ fertility and need to be 
controlled for in the regressions. 
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For the estimation of immigrants’ assimilation of son preference, I propose two 
sets of analysis. The first one examines intergenerational assimilation between generations 
of immigrants. I again compare the change in the probability of having another child and 
the next child being a boy if the previous children are all girls relative to all boys – now 
taking the difference across first-generation parents who migrated from Asian countries 
against those of second and higher generations in the U.S.  
The second channel considers the development of son preference and assimilation 
at the individual level, exploiting variation in one’s age at arrival to the U.S. In order to do 
this, I estimate a differences-in-differences regression according to the following equation 
to capture the difference in son preference across immigrants arriving before and after this 
critical age period.   
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒_𝐴𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖 ∗
𝐴𝑔𝑒_𝐴𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖  + 𝛽5𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒_𝐴𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖 +  𝑋𝑖Γ +  𝜂𝑖        (3) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒_𝐴𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖  is a dummy variable, indicating whether or not mother i 
migrated to the United States after the cutoff age. I follow previous immigrant assimilation 
literature and choose nine years old as the cutoff age for this analysis.72 The coefficient of 
interest, that in front of the interaction term of 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖 and𝐴𝑔𝑒_𝐴𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖  can be 
interpreted as the change in the probability of having another child (or of the next child 
being male) should the previous children of family i be all girls specifically for mothers 
who have arrived at the age of nine and above in comparison to that change in probability 
for those who arrived at a younger age. 
                                                 
72 Bleakley and Chin (2004, 2010) and Hicks et al. (2015) use nine years old as the “critical period” cutoff. I 




3.4.1 Results for Basic Regression 
Table 12 reports the influence of son preference on fertility for the full sample of 
families with oldest child 12 years of age or younger in the U.S., as well as for the sample 
of families where the mother is either native-born, or a first-generation immigrant, a G7 
immigrant, or a South, East, and Southeast Asian immigrant. 73  Panel A of Table 12 
provides the results of preference for at least one son, outcomes of regression equation 1, 
for the above five samples. For families with at least one child, the coefficient of interest 
in front of all girls for parents in the U.S. is -0.002 and insignificant, indicating no strong 
influence of initial child gender on the decision to have a second child. 
The coefficient for the sample of natives is actually negative and significant. This 
means that the probability of having a second child within the next six years is 0.4 
percentage points lower if the first child of the family is a daughter relative to a son. For 
first-generation immigrants, this pattern is reversed. Having only a girl leads to a positive 
and significant increase in the odds of having a second child. Specifically, for the sample 
of immigrants who migrate from South, East, and Southeast Asia, the coefficient is 0.023 
and significant at 1%. This implies that immigrants from Asian countries are 2.3 
percentage points more likely to have another child if they have a previous girl to a boy. 
Comparatively, the coefficient on all girls for immigrants from G7 countries is negative 
and not significant. Thus, I conclude that families who migrate from SE Asian countries 
are more likely to have a second child if the previous child is a girl rather than a boy.  
                                                 
73 The complete regression results with coefficients on all covariates are available upon request. 
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For families considering a third child, the coefficients on all girls are all positive 
and significant at 1% across all samples. It seems like parents in the United States have the 
incentive to have a third child if the previous children are all girls, but people would argue 
that families with all girls tend to have a higher probability of having another child relative 
to families with at least one son simply due to preference of gender balancing but not son 
preference. To exclude out the effect of this concern, I run the regression of equation 2 
additionally controlling for the dummy variable mix, indicating families with both daughter 
and son.74 The coefficients on all girls are again negative for the full sample and natives, 
and it is significant at 1% for natives.  
For G7 immigrants, the coefficient becomes positive but not significant. For first-
generation immigrants and SE Asian immigrants group, the coefficients are still positive 
and significant at 1%. Furthermore, the magnitudes are even larger than the case of 
families with at least one child. These results show that, son preferences among most 
households in the U.S. are mainly driven by a preference of gender balancing. On the other 
hand, immigrant families with previous children being all girls are more likely to have a 
third child than families with two boys first, a phenomenon that is especially true for SE 
Asian immigrants.  
 Table 13 follows the same empirical strategy, this time for another dependent 
variable, whether the next child is male. 75  For families with at least one child, the 
coefficients in front of all girls are all negative for the samples of families in the United 
States, natives, first-generation immigrants, and G7 immigrants, and they are significant at 
1% for the first two groups. For the sample of SE Asian immigrants, the coefficient is 
                                                 
74 The coefficients in front of mix are all negative and significant for all samples, providing evidence for 
gender balancing. 
75 The complete regression results with coefficients on covariates are available upon request. 
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positive but not significant. This implies that the first-generation of Asian immigrants did 
not exhibit gender selection for the second child.  
For families with at least two children, the coefficients on all girls are all positive 
and significant at 1% for those samples. However, this appears to be mostly driven by 
gender balancing preferences for native born households. Coefficients in front of all girls 
are positive and significant at 10% to 1% for immigrants. G7 as well as SE Asian 
immigrants are particularly more likely to have a son as their third child if the previous two 
children are all girls relative to all boys.  
I conclude that there is little evidence for son preference among natives through 
either fertility stopping decisions or from gender selection in the U.S.  At the same time, 
families who migrate from South, East, and Southeast Asia countries are more likely to 
have additional children if the previous children are all girls than all boys, and appear to 
influence the gender of the third child. A broader pool of G7 immigrants does not exhibit 
son preference to nearly the same degree. 
3.4.2 Regional Disaggregation 
To better understand the son preference among SE Asian immigrants, I 
decompose the sample of SE Asian immigrants into families who migrate from a specific 
country in South, East, and Southeast Asia. With the concern of previous literature and 
sample size, I run regressions on the sample of immigrants who are from China, Japan, 
Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, and India respectively as shown in Table 14 and 15. For 
families who migrate from China, Vietnam, and India with at least one child, they are 4.3, 
3.4, and 2.9 percentage points more likely to have a second child if the family had a girl 
first relative to have a boy first. Controlling for gender balancing, when the previous two 
children are all girls, families from China and Vietnam both exhibit a higher propensity to 
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have a third child than families with all boys. Indian immigrants still hold the similar change 
in the probability of having another child for families with girls only to boys only when 
families with at least two children as families with at least one child. 
Interestingly, first-generation immigrants who are from Japan, Korea, and 
Philippines do not exhibit a significant preference to have an additional child if the 
previous children are all daughters rather than all sons. Panel A of Table 15 shows that 
there is no significant evidence for gender selection among first-generation immigrants 
who are from those six countries to have a son as their second child. While, immigrants 
who are from China, Vietnam, and India have higher, 6.1, 4.2, and 2.1 percentage points, 
the probability to have a male child if the previous two children are all girls rather than all 
boys. 
To most easily compare the magnitude and significance level of son preference for 
different samples, I draw the coefficients on all girls with confidence interval for 
regressions as shown in Figure 16. Panel A and B provide the coefficients on all girls both 
for families with at least one child and those with at least two children. It can be clearly 
seen from the regression results that immigrants from China, Vietnam, and India have 
stronger son preference than natives and immigrants from other countries. From this 
section, I conclude that there is no strong evidence for son preference among immigrants 
who are from Japan, Korea, and Philippines, while immigrants who are from China, 
Vietnam, and India exhibit son preference and may also practice some gender selection 
for higher birth order children when faced with no male births.  
3.4.3 Results for Immigrant Assimilation  
Tables 16 and 17 provide results for the fertility stopping and gender selection 
hypotheses for higher order generation immigrants who are from the South, East, and 
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Southeast Asian countries. In panel A of Table 16, it is immediately apparent that there is 
no significant change in the probability of having a second child between families with a 
first girl and families with a first boy. This coefficient becomes positive for larger size 
families. When I control the preference for gender balancing, higher order generation 
immigrants who are from Asian countries, in aggregate, have 1.8 higher percentage points 
to have a third child if they have two girls first rather than two boys, but the effect is not 
significant for the pooled sample.  
When I disaggregate the analysis again to country level, families whose ancestors 
are from India are 10.9 more percentage points to have a third child if the previous children 
are all girls than all boys, and the coefficient on all girls is significant at 1%. This effect 
massively dwarfs those from previous regressions.  
For the results of gender selection behavior as shown in Table 17, higher order 
generation immigrants again do not significantly influence the gender of their second child 
even if their first child is a daughter. However, families whose ancestors are from India 
still remain an outlier, with a strong preference to have a son should the first two births 
be girls. The coefficient on all girls is 0.076 and significant at 5%.  
Comparing the results of higher order generation immigrants to the results of first-
generation immigrants, I find that immigrants who are from Asian counties tend to have 
a lower change of probability in having additional children if they have all girls with higher 
order generation than with first-generation. Assimilation is most prevalent among 
immigrants who are from China. First-generation immigrants have the strongest son 
preference among other Asian immigrants, however, I don’t find any significant evidence 
of son preference for the higher order generation immigrants. Meanwhile, I don’t find 
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significant evidence of son preference among both first-generation and higher order 
generation immigrants who are from Korea and Philippines.  
Indian immigrants are again a clear outlier.76 The coefficients on all girls are larger 
for higher order generation immigrants than the first-generation immigrants. This 
discrepancy is surprising and suggests an interesting avenue for future investigation. It is 
mainly from the unusual strong son preference among higher order generation Indian 
immigrants. The plausible explanation is provided at the end of this section. 
To further understand the process of formation and assimilation among 
immigrants, I run a differences-in-differences regression on the sample of first-generation 
immigrants who are from SE Asian countries, by adding the dummy variable Arrived at 
age 9+, whether immigrants have arrived at age nine and above, and the interaction term 
of it with all girls as described in equation 3.  
Tables 18 and 19 provide results for fertility stopping decision and gender selection 
behavior respectively. The coefficients on arrived at age 9+ are significantly negative. This 
implies that families who migrate at an older age tend to have fewer children than families 
who arrived at an earlier age. The sum of the coefficients in front of arrived at age 9+ and 
the interaction term of it with all girls are still negative for all samples.77 This result is 
consistent with the difference between the first-generation and higher order generation 
Asian immigrants. Simply comparing the group of arriving at younger than nine years old 
                                                 
76 I run a differences-in-differences regression on the two samples as following: 𝑌𝑖  =  𝛽0  +
 𝛽1𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖  +  + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑖  +  𝛽4𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑠𝑖 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑖  +
𝛽5𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑖 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑖 +  𝛽6𝑋𝑖  +  𝜃𝑖 , for both dependent variables. The coefficients in front of the 
interaction term of all girls and higher order generation are 0.104 and 0.062 respectively, and they are 
significant at 1% and 5%. However, when I run the above regressions for sample of immigrants who are 
from China, the coefficients in front of the interaction term of all girls and higher order generation for the 
dependent variables, fertility and male child, are 0.16 and -0.033, and none of them is significant at 10%. 
77 The combination of coefficients in front of Arrived at age 9+ and the interaction term of it with all girls 
is the coefficient for families who migrated at age nine and above with all girls.  
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to above, the group of arriving at age nine and above has a smaller average number of 
children than below.78 The explanation for this could be the pressure from surviving in the 
United States or selection into the age of migration on the basis of economic outcomes 
not captured perfectly by our set of controls.79  
Families who migrate at an older age may experience more pressure of 
communication, relationship, and different culture than those who arrive at a younger age. 
Column 1 of Tables 18 and 19 provide the results of the differences-in-differences 
regression on the sample of immigrants who are from the South, East, and Southeast Asia 
in aggregate. The coefficients on the interaction term of all girls and arrived at age 9+ are 
both positive and significant for the dependent variable fertility decision.80 For another 
dependent variable, gender selection, the coefficient on the interaction term is 0.055, and 
it is significant at 1% in families with at least one child. For families with at least two 
children, the coefficient is positive but not significant.  
As such, immigrants who are from Asian countries, in aggregate, have stronger 
son preference if they arrived at age nine and above than they arrived at younger. This 
finding could also be consistent with exposure to home country norms influencing later 
life fertility decisions, assuming that early years are formative years regarding these sets of 
preferences.  
Figure 17 and 18 flexibly plot regression adjusted coefficient estimates on all girls 
across mothers’ age of migration within first-generation immigrants from Asian countries 
with at least one and two children. The results are consistent with the choice of the critical 
                                                 
78 For the samples of first-generation and higher order generation immigrants who are from South, East, 
and Southeast Asia countries, I also find a larger mean of number of children for the higher order generation.  
79 For example, maybe initially they spend more time and money on surviving in the new countries. They 
get married later, spend less time on children, and have stronger incentive to integrate into local 
community. 
80 They are significant at 1% and 5% respectively.  
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period cutoff as the coefficients become positive and significant only among families who 
migrate at later in their life. These flexible plots suggest between 7 and 11 is an appropriate 
age to be used as the cutoff.  
There is again heterogeneity in the results for the sample at the country level as 
shown in column 2 to 5 of Tables 18 and  
9. The change in the probability of having a third child for immigrants who are 
from China is 17.1 more percentage points in families whose previous children are all girls 
and who migrated at the age of nine and above relative to those with all boys and arrived 
at the age of nine and above. Moreover, Chinese immigrants who had girls only and arrived 
at the age nine and above have a higher probability of having another male child than 
families had boys only and migrated at the age of nine and above. Immigrants who are 
from India and Vietnam also have the stronger preference to have a third child if the 
families who migrated at the age of nine and above with girls only relative to those arrived 
at the age of nine and older with boys only. However, they don’t have significant bias on 
the gender of the second and third child even the previous children are all daughters. There 
is no significant evidence of son preference among immigrants who are from Korea and 
Philippines for the different groups of the gender of previous children and arriving age.  
Combining the results with the variation in different generations and arriving age, 
I find evidence for the assimilation of son preference among SE Asian immigrants. 
Families who are from SE Asian countries tend to have stronger son preference among 
the first generation. They also exhibit strong son preference when they arrived at the age 
of nine or above. The assimilation among Chinese immigrants stands out in particular. 
They have the strongest son preference for the first-generation immigrants among the 
analyzed countries, while, I don’t find any significant evidence of son preference among 
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higher-order generation immigrants. The assimilation among Vietnamese immigrants is 
also obvious. However, the trend is different for Indian immigrants. They have stronger 
son preference among higher-order generation immigrants than the first-generation 
immigrants. One plausible explanation may be the higher proportion of marriages among 
the same ethnic group for Indian immigrants than immigrants from other ethnic groups. 
The high proportion of marriages among Indian immigrants facilitate those families keep 
their own tradition and social norm which includes son preference at home. In Table 20, 
92% of first-generation Indian immigrant mothers get married to first-generation Indian 
immigrant fathers.81 This statistic is consistent with the plausible explanation. 
3.5 Extensions 
3.5.1 Cox Hazard 
As a robustness check, I consider a more detailed analysis of birth spacing. Cox 
hazard regression results, presented in Table 21, are broadly consistent with the results of 
LPM regressions. The coefficients on all girls for the full sample and natives are negative 
and significant. The corresponding hazard ratios are less than 1. These ratios indicate that 
families whose first child is a girl are 0.7% and 0.9% less likely to have another child than 
those whose first child is a boy. 
For families who migrated from Asian countries, parents whose first child is a 
daughter are 0.9% more likely to have another child than those whose previous child is a 
son, but the coefficient is not significant. When I consider higher parity of children, even 
though the coefficients are no longer precisely estimated, they still produce the same sign 
as previous regressions. 
                                                 
81 For first-generation immigrant Chinese and Vietnamese, the proportions are 72% and 75%. 
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3.5.2 Effects of the Gender of Children on Mother’s Marital Status   
Even though we don’t find evidence of strong forms of son preference among 
natives in the U.S. through fertility stopping decision and gender selection, it does not 
mean there could not be weaker evidence of son preference. According to Dahl and 
Moretti (2008), son preference in the U.S. can be seen in parents’ marital status, with 
marriage more commonly occurring before and after male births.  
In Table 22, I run regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal 
to 1 if a mother with at least one child is divorced, separated, or never married, and 0 if 
the mother is married at the time of the survey. This is regressed on the gender of previous 
children with the complete set of covariates from equation 3 as well as a control for 
number of children and for families with one child or more. The indicator of the gender 
of previous children labeled ‘all girls’ is set equal to 1 if the previous children are all 
daughters.  
The estimated coefficients on all girls indicate the change in the probability of 
divorce if families have girls only relative to they have at least one son. The coefficients 
are all positive, and for the full sample, natives, as well as first-generation immigrants, they 
are significant at 1% to 5%. This indicates that U.S. households, consistent with the 
previous analysis, are either more likely to marry, or less likely to separate after having 
sons.82 Even though the magnitudes, 0.5, 0.6, and 0.2 percentage points, seem like small, 
percentage effects are actually very large, at 9.5%, 11%, and 4.4%, and are thus quite non-
negligible.83 Thus, I can conclude that son preference in the U.S. is not obvious, and it is 
                                                 
82 I cannot precisely define the time of divorce. The estimated results maybe the outcomes of divorce but 
not the reason, for example, fathers are more likely to get the custody of sons but not daughters when they 
get divorced. In this case, it still shows at least fathers’ son preference in the U.S.  
83 There are 5.28% mothers with at least one child are divorced, separated, or never married in the U.S. 
There are 5.47% native mothers with at least one child are divorced, separated, or never married. There are 
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perhaps more likely to operate via fathers rather than mothers among the native born 
population. Or I can conclude that among normal marriage, there is no significant 
evidence of son preference among parents in the U.S., but out of normal marriage, fathers 
prefer sons rather than daughters. Although the estimates for the subsamples of G7 
immigrants and SE Asian immigrants are of the same sign, they are imprecisely estimated.84       
3.5.3 Formation and Assimilation of Son Preference 
 The results of Tables 18 and 19 as well as Figures 17 and 18 suggest that 
individuals develop their son preference early in life, most likely about at the age of 7 to 
11 years.85 A natural next question is whether son preference, once developed, is persistent. 
Figures 19 and 20 plot the coefficient on all girls as a function of the duration of time 
spent in the U.S. before the birth of the first child.86 The logic here is to examine whether 
the extent of son preference among first-generation Asian immigrants may change with 
the duration of time resided in the U.S.  
In these specifications, I additionally control for age of migration since we have 
already shown that it matters for the formation of son preference. As can be seen from 
the figures, longer duration of residence in the U.S. has little bearing on the degree of son 
preference exhibited in these households. In Figures 19 and 20, the coefficients on all girls 
are consistent across the duration of time spent in the U.S.87 This suggests that first-
                                                 
4.57% mothers who are first-generation immigrants with at least one child are divorced, separated, or never 
married.  
84 The proportions for G7 and SE Asian immigrants are 2.22% and 3.77% respectively. 
85 This period is consistent with the period of formation of other language related norms. (Bleakley and 
Chin, 2004; Hicks et al., 2015) 
86 Duration of time spent in the U.S. equals to age at time of immigration minuses mother’s age at the 
birth of her first child. 
87 When I choose 18 years old as the age cut off for regressions in Table 8 and 9, the coefficients on all 




generation Asian immigrants in aggregate are unlikely to have these particular cultural 
preferences altered by exposure to U.S. culture. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper studies several populations of families in the U.S., including both 
natives and immigrants, to explore the repercussions of son preference. In order to do 
this, I analyze the effects of the gender of previous children on families’ further fertility 
decision and gender selection behavior. As a novel addition, this article explores the 
formation and malleability of these preferences – studying assimilation of son preference 
among Asian immigrants through the variation of the age of migration and 
intergenerational transmissions.  
I find that there is no robust evidence for son preference among natives in the 
U.S., but there is indirect evidence from the effects of the gender of children on mother’s 
marital status to support the existence of son preference among natives. I also show that 
the change in the probability of having additional children and the next child being male 
is significant and positive for Asian immigrants if their previous children are all girls 
relative to all boys. First-generation immigrants again exhibit stronger son preference than 
higher order generation immigrants who are from Asian countries. 
Moreover, Asian immigrants who arrived at the age of nine and above are 
significantly more likely to have another child if the gender composition of previous 
children is female than families who migrated at the age of nine and above with previous 
children being all male. Son preference among SE Asian immigrants is developed in early 
of life, and once established, it is kind of persistent with the first-generation Asian 
immigrants who migrated after the age of nine. However, I find significant evidence of 
assimilation of son preference among intergeneration Asian immigrants. The most 
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obvious assimilation occurs for Chinese immigrants. They exhibit the strongest son 
preference among analyzed Asian countries with the first-generation immigrants, yet this 
disappears for higher-order generations. Indian immigrants show the opposite trend. 
Higher order generation of Indian immigrants has stronger son preference than the first 




Table 11. Summary Statistics 
Household Level mean sd 
Panel A: Demographics / Education Statistics  
Household size 3.99 0.98 
Family income 98,810 89,883 
Mother in labor force 0.62 0.49 
Mother's age at marriage 27.87 5.86 
Mother's education high school and above 0.93 0.25 
Mother's education bachelor’s degree and above 0.46 0.50 
Father in labor force 0.92 0.27 
Father's education high school and above 0.89 0.31 
Father's education bachelor’s degree and above 0.39 0.49 
   
Panel B: Country of Birth / Ancestry 
First-generation immigrants 0.20 0.40 
Immigrants from East, SE Asian countries and 
regions  
0.07 0.26 
Immigrants from China 0.01 0.10 
Immigrants from Japan 0.003
 0.05 
Immigrants from Korea 0.01 0.07 
Immigrants from Philippines 0.01 0.10 
Immigrants from Vietnam 0.01 0.08 
Immigrants from India 0.02 0.15 
Higher order generation immigrants (SE Asian 
countries) 
0.02 0.14 
   
Panel C: Fertility  
Mother's age of first birth 26.61 4.74 
Number of children 1.91 0.89 
% of household with all girls 0.30 0.46 
% of household with all boys 0.32 0.47 
% of household with mix  0.38 0.49 
         
       Notes: The sample covers families with married mothers between age 18 and 40, 
and with at least one child and the oldest one is 12 years old or younger in the 
United States. The unit of observations is the household, and there are 490,858 
households in the sample.  





Table 12. The influence of son preference on fertility in the U.S. 
Notes: The dependent variable, fertility, indicates having another child within six years of 
previous child’s birth. (a). “Had second child” represents the sample of families with at 
least one child and may have additional children later. The unit of observations is the 
household, and the sample size for each group is 480,360; 383,683; 96,677; 6,443; 34,592 
respectively. (b) “Had third child’ represents the sample of families with at least two 
children and may have additional children later. The sample size for each group is 
308,378; 248,195; 60,183; 3,970; 18,832 respectively. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 















Panel A: Preference for at least one son 
Had Second Child (
a) 
All girls -0.002 -0.004*** 0.007** -0.005 0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.005) 
 
     
Had Third Child (b) 
All girls 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.041*** 0.043** 0.050*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.017) (0.006) 
 
Panel B: Son preference controlling for gender balancing 
effects   
Had Third Child      
All girls -0.004 -0.008*** 0.015*** 0.018 0.031*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.020) (0.008) 
Mix -0.056*** -0.060*** -0.039*** -0.038** -0.029*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.016) (0.006) 
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Table 13. The influence of son preference on gender selection in the U.S 
 













Panel A: Son preference for at least one son 
Had Second Child 
All girls  -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.004 0.005 
 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) 
 
      
Had Third 
Child 
      
All girls  0.019*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.014) (0.005) 
       
Panel B: Son preference controlling for gender balancing effects 
Had Third Child 
All girls  -0.003 -0.005*** 0.007* 0.032** 0.024*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.016) (0.006) 
Mix  -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.024*** -0.012 -0.017*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.013) (0.005) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable, male child, indicates whether the next child is a boy. 
Sample sizes are as described in Table 12. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 




Table 14. The influence of son preference on fertility for first-generation immigrants 
from Asia 
 Fertility 
 China Japan Korea Philippines Vietnam India 
Panel A: Son preference for at least one son    
Had Second Child (
a) 
All girls 0.043*** -0.036 0.016 0.013 0.034** 0.029*** 
 (0.013) (0.027) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) (0.009) 
       
Had Third Child (b) 
All girls 0.079*** 0.002 0.027 0.043** 0.094*** 0.037*** 
 (0.017) (0.039) (0.025) (0.020) (0.023) (0.008) 
       
Panel B: Son preference controlling for gender balancing effects   
Had Third Child       
All girls 0.064*** -0.040 -0.003 0.029 0.069** 0.027*** 
 (0.019) (0.045) (0.030) (0.024) (0.027) (0.010) 
Mix -0.023 -0.068* -0.046* -0.021 -0.040* -0.016** 
 (0.015) (0.037) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.008) 
 
Notes: The samples include families who migrated from those Asian countries. The 
dependent variable, fertility, indicates having another child within six years of previous 
child’s birth. (a). “Had second child” represents the sample of families with at least one 
child and may have additional children later. The unit of observations is the household, 
and the sample size for each group is 5,126; 1,364; 2,671; 4,601; 3,099; 11,282 
respectively. (b) “Had third child’ represents the sample of families with at least two 
children and may have additional children later. The sample size for each group is 2,620; 
775; 1,549; 2,505; 5,655 respectively. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 




Table 15. The influence of son preference on gender selection for first-generation 
immigrants from Asia 
 Male Child 
 China Japan Korea Philippines Vietnam India 
Panel A: Son preference for at least one son    
Had Second Child 
All girls 0.009 -0.024 0.012 -0.000 -0.000 0.011 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.008) 
       
Had Third Child       
All girls 0.065*** 0.003 0.014 0.016 0.056*** 0.029*** 
 (0.014) (0.031) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.007) 
       
Panel B: Son preference controlling for gender balancing effects   
Had Third Child       
All girls 0.061*** -0.031 0.012 0.013 0.042* 0.021** 
 (0.015) (0.037) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.008) 
Mix -0.006 -0.054* -0.002 -0.005 -0.022 -0.013** 
 (0.011) (0.030) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.006) 
 
Notes: The samples include families who migrated from those Asian countries. Sample 
sizes are as described in Table 12. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 




Table 16. The influence of son preference on fertility for higher order generation 
immigrants from Asia 
Higher order generation  
immigrants 
  Fertility    
SE Asian China Korea 
Philippin
es Vietnam India 
Panel A: Son preference for at least one son    
Had Second Child (
a)       
All girls 0.010 0.015 -0.002 0.005 0.018 0.035 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.030) (0.019) (0.042) (0.027) 
       
Had Third Child (b)       
All girls 0.046*** 0.036 0.105** 0.061** 0.073 0.088** 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.042) (0.027) (0.066) (0.035) 
       
Panel B: Son preference controlling for gender balancing effects   
Had Third Child       
All girls 0.018 -0.007 0.046 0.049 0.005 0.109*** 
 (0.016) (0.035) (0.052) (0.032) (0.077) (0.040) 
Mix -0.045*** -0.068** -0.090** -0.018 -0.098* 0.032 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.041) (0.026) (0.057) (0.033) 
 
Notes: The samples contain families who are descendants of immigrants of those Asian 
countries. The dependent variable, fertility, indicates having another child within six 
years of previous child’s birth. (a). “Had second child” represents the sample of families 
with at least one child and may have additional children later. The unit of observations is 
the household, and the sample size for each group is 9,491; 2,067; 1,078; 2,724; 574; 
1,238 respectively. (b) “Had third child’ represents the sample of families with at least 
two children and may have additional children later. The sample size for each group is 
5,520; 1,154; 626; 1,609; 313; 720 respectively. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: American Community Survey from 2012 to 2016. 
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Table 17. The influence of son preference on gender selection for higher order 
generation immigrants from Asia 
Higher order generation  
immigrants   
Male 
Child    
SE Asian China Korea Philippines Vietnam India 
Panel A: Son preference for at least one son    
Had Second Child       
All girls -0.003 0.007 -0.001 -0.003 0.051 -0.029 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.028) (0.018) (0.040) (0.025) 
       
Had Third Child       
All girls 0.019* 0.028 0.074** 0.009 -0.031 0.058** 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.033) (0.021) (0.051) (0.027) 
       
Panel B: Son preference controlling for gender balancing effects   
Had Third Child       
All girls -0.007 0.002 0.023 -0.020 -0.071 0.076*** 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.041) (0.025) (0.062) (0.028) 
Mix -0.041*** -0.041* -0.078** -0.046** -0.057 0.028 
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.033) (0.021) (0.051) (0.021) 
 
Notes: The samples contain families who are descendants of immigrants of those Asian 
countries. Sample sizes are as described in Table 16. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 




Table 18. The influence of son preference on fertility for first-generation immigrants 
from Asia and arrived at the age of 9 above 
First-generation 
immigrants arrived at 
age 9+ 
  Fertility    
SE 
Asian China Korea Philippines Vietnam India 
Had Second Child (
a) 
All girls -0.019 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.049 -0.020 
 (0.015) (0.050) (0.033) (0.039) (0.036) (0.044) 
Arrived at age 9+ -0.096*** -0.106*** -0.082*** -0.055* -0.038 -0.060* 
 (0.011) (0.037) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) 
All girls*arrived at age 
9+ 
0.048*** 0.045 0.011 0.004 -0.020 0.051 
 (0.016) (0.052) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.045) 
       
Had Third Child (b)       
All girls -0.029 -0.094 -0.001 0.014 -0.018 -0.122* 
 (0.024) (0.077) (0.057) (0.066) (0.058) (0.063) 
Arrived at age 9+ -0.153*** -0.177*** -0.077* -0.088* -0.106** -0.182*** 
 (0.018) (0.062) (0.046) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) 
All girls*arrived at age 
9+ 
0.069*** 0.171** -0.003 0.017 0.113* 0.156** 
 (0.026) (0.080) (0.067) (0.071) (0.066) (0.064) 
Mix -0.093*** -0.155** -0.081* -0.045 -0.113** -0.092 
 (0.021) (0.070) (0.045) (0.056) (0.050) (0.058) 
Mix*arrived at age 9+ 0.075*** 0.144** 0.051 0.028 0.094* 0.081 
 (0.022) (0.071) (0.053) (0.060) (0.056) (0.059) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable, fertility, indicates having another child within six years of 
previous child’s birth. (a). “Had second child” represents the sample of families with at 
least one child and may have additional children later. The unit of observations is the 
household, and the sample size for each group is 34,592; 5,126; 2,671; 4,601; 3,099; 
11,282respectively. (b) “Had third child’ represents the sample of families with at least 
two children and may have additional children later. The sample size for each group is 
18,832; 2,620; 775; 1,549; 2,505; 1,908; 5,655 respectively. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 




Table 19. The influence of son preference on gender selection for first-generation 
immigrants from Asia and arrived at the age of 9 above 
First-generation 




Asian China Korea Philippines Vietnam India 
Had Second Child       
All girls -0.044*** -0.076 -0.019 -0.029 -0.007 -0.040 
 (0.014) (0.047) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.041) 
Arrived at age 9+ -0.052*** -0.049 -0.083*** -0.024 -0.002 -0.039 
 (0.011) (0.036) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) 
All girls*arrived at age 
9+ 
0.055*** 0.091* 0.042 0.033 0.008 0.052 
 (0.015) (0.049) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.042) 
       
Had Third Child       
All girls 0.015 -0.067 -0.008 0.091 0.038 0.045 
 (0.019) (0.057) (0.039) (0.056) (0.047) (0.054) 
Arrived at age 9+ -0.060*** -0.094** -0.010 -0.018 -0.028 -0.055 
 (0.014) (0.048) (0.034) (0.040) (0.037) (0.034) 
All girls*arrived at age 
9+ 
0.011 0.140** 0.030 -0.095 0.006 -0.026 
 (0.020) (0.059) (0.047) (0.060) (0.054) (0.054) 
Mix -0.045*** -0.103** -0.008 0.009 -0.040 -0.051 
 (0.016) (0.051) (0.033) (0.045) (0.039) (0.039) 
Mix*arrived at age 9+ 0.034** 0.104** 0.010 -0.016 0.024 0.041 
 (0.017) (0.052) (0.039) (0.048) (0.044) (0.040) 
 
Notes: Sample sizes are as described in Table 8. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 














China Vietnam India 
 SE 
Asian 
China Vietnam India 
First-generation immigrants  
China 0.82 0.80 0.72 0.02 0.01  0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Vietnam 0.82 0.81 0.02 0.75 0.01  0.07 0.02 0.04 0.00 
India 0.95 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.92  0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Higher-order generation immigrants  
China 0.21 0.18 0.07 0.03 0.00  0.32 0.22 0.01 0.01 
Vietnam 0.28 0.27 0.01 0.19 0.00  0.27 0.04 0.17 0.01 
India 0.38 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.23  0.28 0.01 0.00 0.26 
 
Note: The entry represents the proportion of the race of first-generation or higher-order 
generation immigrants’ husband. For example, the first entry, 0.82, indicates that 82% of 
First-generation Chinese immigrants (mothers) get married with first-generation 
immigrants from abroad of the U.S.  
Source: American Community Survey from 2012 to 2016. 
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Had Second Child (
a) 
All girls -0.007*** -0.009*** 0.003 -0.009 0.009 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.016) (0.008) 
      
Had Third Child (b)      
All girls 0.003 0.001 0.016 -0.012 0.035 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.041) (0.022) 
Mix -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.031*** 0.025 -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.036) (0.021) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the duration between the first and second child as well 
as the second and the third child. (a). The sample size for each group is 686,575; 539,104; 
147,471; 10,044; 44,570 respectively. (b) The sample size for each group is 226,162; 
177,083; 49,079; 2,743; 9,678 respectively. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 















All girls 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.002** 0.003 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Mother's education high 
school and above 
-0.051*** -0.090*** -0.026*** -0.017 -0.036*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.004) 
Mother's education 
bachelor’s degree and 
above 
-0.020*** -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Mother's age at marriage 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Family income 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Father's education high 
school and above 
-0.030*** -0.038*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) 
Father's education 
bachelor’s degree and 
above 
-0.000 0.004*** -0.010*** 0.005** -0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Mother's age -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of children -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.008*** -0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of observations 1,112,703 874,581 238,122 15,920 78,178 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the mother with at least one 
child is divorced, separated, or never married. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 




Figure 16. The influence of son preference on fertility in the U.S. with confidence 
intervals 
Panel A The influence of son preference on fertility stopping decision 
 
Panel B The influence of son preference on gender selection 
 
Note: Confidence intervel is 95%. Regressions include all covariates described in equation 2, 
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